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1Murdoch University
An Overview
Located in Perth, Western Australia, and strategically placed in the Indo-Pacific 
region, Murdoch University is a leading Australian research university that ranks 
in the world’s top four per cent of Higher Education institutions and was ranked 
57 in the top 100 universities under the age of 50 (Times Higher Education World 
University Rankings 2012-2013).
Opened in 1975, Murdoch now attracts more than 22,000 students and 2,000 
staff from over 90 countries. Reflecting its strong focus on local community 
engagement, the University has three Western Australian campuses, located in 
Perth, Rockingham and Mandurah. Internationally, Murdoch also has 6,000 
students in Singapore and strong links with Indonesia and Malaysia. 
A recent Australian Government audit of research excellence found that 
Murdoch University is performing at world class standard (or above) in over 
85 per cent of the assessed areas. Many of our areas of expertise have global 
implications, including climate change, food security and production, infectious 
diseases, veterinary and medical science, mental health, politics, public policy 
and governance. Our researchers regularly engage with significant social and 
scientific challenges, adding to the existing body of knowledge across a range of 
disciplines. With a strong emphasis on translational research, many projects have 
been applied practically for the benefit of both the local and global community.
The University has a strong focus on equipping graduates with both scholarly 
and ‘real world’ experience. As part of our strategic vision for the future, we 
are looking to embed research into the culture of all parts of the University. 
Research skills are an important part of the curriculum and we continue to build 
a workforce focused on creating new knowledge, as well as delivering research-
led teaching and evidence-based practice.
Internationally, Murdoch University is strengthening its ties with the Indo-
Pacific region, bringing together business, academia and government in 
innovative ways to assist Western Australia’s future in the region and establish 
the University as a premier knowledge hub focused on key areas of policy and 
research, reflecting national and international priorities. These areas include:
The Asia Research Centre
Established in 1991, the Asia Research Centre is an international leader in 
the study of East and Southeast Asia, undertaking fundamental disciplinary 
and interdisciplinary research examining a range of social, political and 
economic forces and developments within this dynamic region. Highlights of 
the Centre’s recent research projects include studies of the political economy of 
aid effectiveness, populist Islam in Indonesia and the Middle East, and several 
investigations of the politics of the poor, state-building, representation and 
political regimes in Southeast Asia. 
2The WA State Agricultural Biotechnology Centre (SABC)
The SABC is the major research Centre for R&D in agricultural and veterinary 
biotechnology in Western Australia. It is a resource centre that provides 
laboratory space, platform technologies and world class equipment and facilities 
for R&D in agricultural biotechnology to researchers from universities, the 
State Government (Department of Agriculture and Food WA) and industry. 
The SABC underpins R&D in biosecurity and food security, crop pre-breeding, 
transgenic crops, and molecular biology for about 150 researchers, and plays 
a major role in training Honours and PhD students in a multi-disciplinary 
environment. Research undertaken focuses on molecular activities (eg genomics, 
gene discovery and functional genomics, marker-assisted breeding, proteomics, 
molecular diagnostics, genetic manipulation; incubation of start-up companies 
and commercialisation) that involve or promote primary production of crop 
plants, commercial livestock, or microbes, or their subsequent processing for 
added value. 
The Institute for Immunology and Infectious Diseases (IIID)
The IIID makes a valuable contribution to global communities and the medical 
industry through research that brings together experts in clinical medicine, 
basic science, mathematics and computing to focus on clinical problems in 
infectious diseases and immunology. Our researchers have already made an 
enormous difference to the way HIV AIDS and other disease are treated, and 
have built and maintained the world’s largest repository of population data on 
HIV and human genetic diversity. The IIID now plans to expand their efforts into 
areas such as clinical pharmacology, haemophilia and thrombosis and tropical 
diseases.
Sir Walter Murdoch School of Public Policy  
and International Affairs
Taking advantage of Murdoch University’s long engagement with practical 
policy questions and deep expertise on Australia, Asia and the Indian Ocean 
region, the Sir Walter Murdoch School is an ambitious new venture in graduate 
education in public policy and international affairs. Masters coursework 
degrees are offered in Public Policy and Management, International Affairs and 
Development Studies, with each course specifically designed to enable high-
achieving, globally-aware professionals to enhance their career trajectory by 
developing disciplinary expertise, professional skills and policy knowledge. Each 
degree concludes with a ‘capstone’ experience, enabling students to apply their 
learning to a practical issue through a policy case study project, a professional 
internship, or a supervised research thesis.
3Sustainable Water, Fisheries and Aquatic Ecosystems
The National Centre for Excellence in Desalination optimises and adapts 
desalination technology for use in Australia’s unique climatic and geographical 
circumstances, helping to create reliable climate resilient fresh water supplies for 
isolated rural and regional areas. Our researchers in the Centre for Fish, Fisheries 
and Aquatic Ecosystem Research are recognised internationally for excellence in 
research and training in approaches to fisheries, aquaculture, biodiversity and 
conservation, and biological processes that impact aquatic ecosystems.
Biosecurity
Through its strong commitment to biosecurity and sustainable food security, 
Murdoch University is taking steps to address this major global issue. The 
University was a core partner in a successful bid to extend funding for the Plant 
Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre, which is working to safeguard Australia 
from invasive plant pests and diseases, with Murdoch University scientists 
providing leadership to the Safeguarding Trade program. The University is 
also working with international collaborators to develop strategies, tools and 
technologies to produce food in a sustainable manner, protect it from loss and 
provide it for regions and communities in a biosecure manner. In 2012, the 
University partnered with researchers from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences to establish the Australia-China Centre for Wheat Quality. Together, 
researchers will map the entire wheat genome. This project has the potential 
to assist grain growers by identifying disease resistant proteins that are able 
to tolerate a wider range of climates, as well as identify quality traits such as 
colour, texture and taste. The University has engaged world class scientists in 
biosecurity and food security related research and in more than 10 disciplines 
this University’s research is assessed as above or well above world standards. 
In addition to sustainable food production, the research focus is on ‘not losing 
what we grow and produce’ in the entire food supply chain, food safety, and 
plant and animal biosecurity across terrestrial and aquatic systems.
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Foreword
Rhetorical assertions notwithstanding, the world of scholarship and the world 
of policy intersect and inform each other much less than they should do. In 
order to secure sound policy making in an era of globalisation this is a deficit 
that must be constantly addressed. It must be addressed not only within states 
but across state borders. Understanding and best practice to inform policy must 
be internationally driven. The aim of this, the First Murdoch Commission, was 
to create a venue at which the worlds of international policy and scholarship 
could come together to address one initial pressing policy question; namely how 
Western Australia (WA) might enhance its understanding of, and relationships 
with, its regional neighbours across a range of key policy areas in the first 
quarter of the 21st century. In keeping with the University’s intention to become 
a leader in research and teaching in public policy at both the national and 
international level, and marked contiguously by the development of the Sir 
Walter Murdoch School of Public Policy and International Affairs, the Commission 
and its Report are intended as an enterprise in applied policy analysis informed 
by rigorous scholarly and analytical thinking.
It is a truism that the WA economy is closely entwined with the dynamic 
economies of the Asia-Pacific. But that is precisely why it is critical to consider 
that regional context in which WA will operate over the coming quarter-century. 
Context cannot simply be assumed. There is a pressing need to leverage the 
prospects that the region will present to WA, and to offer informed analysis to 
business and government regarding policies to maximise the positive regional 
role that WA can play. At the same time, however, it is necessary to provide 
a reality check on a range of inter- and intra-regional challenges that will 
inevitably form a constraining context for policy development. East Asia, albeit 
the most dramatically evolving part of the world, is not without its own trials 
and challenges. 
Drawing from different scholarly traditions, economic analysis of the region is 
often too optimistic while politico-strategic analysis too pessimistic. Good policy 
rarely sits exclusively at one end of this scholarly spectrum. Rather it must be 
informed from along that spectrum. As a consequence a report such as this has 
to push thinking to the limits (the veritable role of the scholar) while at the same 
time ensuring that it captures the imagination of both the public and private 
sector policy community (the role of the practitioner). Making this particular 
marriage work is never an easy task. Too bland, or too obvious, and the report 
quickly passes into history—seemingly the fate of the Gillard Government’s Asia 
Century White Paper. Too ambitious or speculative and it will fail ‘the laugh test’, 
dismissed by its intended audience as ‘merely academic’. 
5It is my judgment that this Report falls into neither of these opposing traps. 
It is incisively hard headed and realistic about the very real challenges that 
face the wider region of which WA—more than other parts of Australia save 
perhaps the Northern Territory—is increasingly a part. This, I am convinced, 
is explained by the fact that the Commission in the preparation of its report 
engaged the region in a way the Asian Century White Paper, again in my 
judgement at least, did not. Not only were the majority of our Commissioners 
from the region, the Commission actually went on the road to actively seek 
insight and views from the policy communities of our major regional partners. At 
the same time however, exhibiting an optimistic streak, the Report, through its 
recommendations, identifies the very real prospects to be gained from ‘getting 
the regional relationship right’. Great opportunities are on offer; but only smart 
well-informed leveraging, underwritten by a genuine mutual reciprocity, will 
consolidate the potential benefits into long-term sustainable gains for WA.
The idea for the Murdoch Commission may have been mine. But that is where 
my input stopped. The credits for this Report must go to others. Accordingly, 
I offer heartfelt, personal and individual thanks to the Co-Chairs, Ms Kerry 
Sanderson and Professor Chung Min Lee. Kerry accepted my invitation to lunch 
one day determined to say ‘no thank you’ to anything I proposed to her. But 
she then went on to Chair the Commission with a diligence, thoroughness and 
commitment reflective of that very best tradition of a truly outstanding career 
public servant and Western Australian. Our other Co-Chair, my dear friend, 
Chung Min Lee brought the grand historical and contemporary socio economic 
and political overviews reflective of the very best of modern applied scholarship. 
Our Commissioners all, in their respective ways, made major contributions. 
It would be invidious to single any of them out. I thank them all. Finally, my 
special thanks go to the two people who made the Commission their own and 
shepherded it through the last 12 months with elan; the Director of Studies, 
Associate Professor Michael Crozier and the Research Coordinator, Ms Cat Bevan-
Jones. It would not have happened without them.
The Commission’s recommendations for regional opportunities show the way 
for Australia in general, but Western Australia in particular, to significantly 
participate in the advancement of regional prosperity. I commend the Report 
to you with some considerable institutional pride and much enthusiasm. It is 
that kind of good public policy analysis that universities, in the service of their 
communities, (should) produce.
Professor Richard Higgott 
VICE CHANCELLOR, MURDOCH UNIVERSITY 
NOVEMBER 2013
6Co-Chairs Mrs Kerry Sanderson AO  
and Professor Chung Min Lee 
Foreword
When Professor Richard Higgott, Vice Chancellor of Murdoch University, 
invited us to co-chair the First Murdoch Commission (FMC), we accepted the 
mission without really knowing the contours of the journey ahead. And what a 
fascinating journey it has been. For nearly a year, the FMC served as a “think 
tank in motion” that brought together leading experts as members of the 
Commission and high-level policymakers, academics, business leaders and also, 
importantly, emerging young leaders from across the region. We are grateful 
to those with whom we interacted for their generous input and the interesting 
discussions we had.
As Co-Chairs of the FMC we appreciated the freedom we were given to work 
with Commissioners to decide our own modus operandi. We made no pretence 
of reinventing the wheel since so many outstanding reports and studies have 
already been made in and out of Australia. Instead, we wanted to provide a 
concise, readable and nuanced stock take of the cumulative consequences of 
Asia’s rise and a reflection on what that may mean for Western Australia and 
Australia. We were particularly seeking recommendations which provide mutual 
benefit and are confident that the findings and recommendations contained 
in the Final Report should achieve this, providing as they do fresh and more 
Asian perspectives on the divergent repercussions of Asia’s rise and implications 
for Australia and Western Australia. In this regard we would like to share three 
insights with readers of the report.
First, the sheer complexity, magnitude, and diversity of Asia means that no 
single paradigm or model can possibly explain the causes and consequences 
of the multiple political, economic, social, cultural, and technological forces 
that are in play today. Understanding and appreciating the region’s multiple 
dimensions—even in the midst of common threads and themes—is central to 
forging more sensitive and sensible strategies towards the region. 
Second, all of the Commissioners shared in the belief that the future of the 
Australian-Asian partnership depended critically on forging stronger ties among 
our leaders and particularly our young leaders across various disciplines so 
that they can help co-shape the Asia of the 21st century. We remain absolutely 
convinced that unparalleled collaboration and cooperation within the Region 
is the only way forward for Asia to tackle its challenges and are conscious that 
Asian economies have profound repercussions on the global economy.
7Third, in order for Australia and Western Australia to retain key advantages 
in the emerging Asian century, it is imperative to allocate key resources into 
enhancing the community’s understanding of the forces that are shaping Asia 
and the importance of culture and relationships in undertaking business in Asia. 
Increased mutual understanding is the platform for appreciating much more 
clearly how Australia and Western Australia can contribute to the rise of a more 
responsible, inclusive, and prosperous Asia.
An endeavour of this magnitude would not have been possible without the 
truly exceptional dedication of key individuals who served as the Commission 
Secretariat throughout the duration of the FMC. We would like to express our 
sincere appreciation to Associate Professor Michael Crozier for his patient and 
thorough hand that guided the Final Report throughout its various phases and 
to Cat Bevan-Jones, Research Coordinator for the FMC in the Vice Chancellor’s 
Office for her truly remarkable organisational skills and unstinting hard work 
and devotion. Last but not least, we would like to extend our deepest thanks to 
Professor Richard Higgott for inviting us to serve as co-chairs and to our fellow 
Commissioners whose insights and deliberations are evident in the pages that 
follow.
  
Kerry Sanderson Chung Min Lee
November 2013
8Acknowledgements
Throughout the proceedings of the Commission, the Secretariat has been 
fortunate to have the assistance of a number of individuals, each of whom has 
made a valuable and much appreciated contribution to our work program. 
In particular, we would like to acknowledge the help and support of Murdoch 
University staff including Professors Ann Capling, Mark Beeson, David Hill and 
Vedi Hadiz, Dr Christopher Vas and Dr Takeshi Moriyama, together with Chris 
Smyth, Andrew Porter, Jeffory Asselin, Richard Sochacki and Ms Pearl Chua 
Kyselicova. We have also been grateful for the ongoing support of our Design, 
Media, Communications, Events and Alumni teams.
The team at QBT Perth has managed the travel arrangements for the 
Commission and we are grateful for the exceptional service that we have 
received from them throughout the year.
Finally, and most importantly, we give our sincere thanks to our Research 
Assistant Mr Bryan Bong and our colleagues in the Vice Chancellery at Murdoch 
University, for their help and support during the year. 
9 
Glossary
AANZFTA ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement. AANZFTA 
is the first time Australia and New Zealand have been involved 
jointly in negotiating an FTA with third countries. It is the first time 
ASEAN has embarked on FTA negotiations covering all sectors 
including goods, services, investment and intellectual property 
simultaneously.
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. APEC is an intergovernmental 
grouping that acts as a forum for facilitating economic growth, 
cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. APEC 
operates on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue 
and equal respect for the views of all participants.
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations aims to accelerate 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region, whilst promoting regional peace and stability through the 
rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. ASEAN comprises 10 countries: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam
ASEAN+6 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, plus China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand
CLMV  Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FIRB  Foreign Investment Review Board
FTA  Free Trade Agreement
FTAAP  Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
Gini Index A measure of the extent to which the distribution of income or 
consumption among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 
represents absolute equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect 
inequality.
10
1 The capitalized term ‘the Region’ is used through out the Report to refer to the ASEAN+6 group of countries: 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, plus China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand
 
HDI Human Development Index. A composite measure of human 
development across three indicators—life expectancy, education 
and income. The HDI sets a maximum and minimum goalpost 
for each indicator. A value between 0 to 1 expresses where each 
country stands in relation to these goalposts. A country with a 
higher level of development will have a value closer to 1. 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity. PPP is the rate at which the currency of 
one country needs to be converted into that of another country 
(generally the US dollar) to buy the same amount of goods and 
services in each country. GDP expressed in PPP rates is thought to 
be a better reflection of the living standards between countries. 
RCEP  Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SCCI  Supply Chain Connectivity Initiative
TPP  Trans Pacific Partnership
WTO  World Trade Organisation
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Executive Summary
21st century Asia is a powerhouse in the contemporary global economy. In a 
short period of time it has closed the development gap between the Region and 
the rest of the world.1 All indications suggest that this growth performance will 
continue into the foreseeable future. 
Australia’s high levels of economic growth over the last decade are directly 
related to Asia’s ‘economic miracle,’ with Western Australia playing a lead role 
in Australia’s regional economic engagement. Indeed, the State has accounted 
for nearly 50 per cent of Australia’s commodity export trade in recent years, 
concentrated overwhelmingly in Asia. In this sense Australia, and Western 
Australia in particular, are becoming increasingly ‘hard wired’ into the Region. 
This presents many opportunities but also challenges. 
The First Murdoch Commission was established to identify how these 
opportunities may be pursued and how the challenges may be addressed. The 
initial impetus was that future prosperity required well-informed strategies and 
policy settings to optimise potential benefits and sustainable gains. 
The broad context of the inquiry was the contemporary rise of Asia. This rise 
is a story of success, yet it is success accompanied by significant challenges. 
Deepening regional integration is an essential part of the story, with the effect 
of distributing risks as well as benefits. The ongoing performance of the Region 
is thus also a question about addressing major problems including rapid 
urbanisation, resources security, demographic burdens and environmental 
pressures. 
This insight underpinned the deliberations of the Commission and its 
investigation of how economic engagement and the growing interdependency 
of Western Australia, Australia and the Region can be pursued to enhance 
mutual benefit and long-term resilience. 
A distinct feature of the Commission’s investigations was its regional approach. 
This included the composition of the Commission’s membership, and a series 
of meetings and consultations with various stakeholder groups and individuals 
in major regional centres. This approach was taken precisely because Australia’s 
core interests are now closely intertwined with Asia’s continuing prosperity and 
stability. 
The Commission found that there is a strategic choice to be taken by Australia: 
whether to remain a mere exporter to the Region or to become a more 
active participant engaging in the Region. The former choice leaves Australia 
susceptible to the volatilities of a game that it has little capacity to influence. By 
contrast, the latter offers Australia far greater potential influence, opportunity 
and long-term benefit for its economic prosperity and wider future. Efforts in 
  1 The capitalised term ‘the Region’ is used through out the Report to refer to the ASEAN+6 group of countries: 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, plus China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
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this space should not underestimate the major challenges confronting both the 
Region and the Australian economy, and how regional cooperation can provide 
ways to address these challenges. 
Western Australia provided a fertile case for the Commission to examine 
regional opportunities and challenges from the standpoint of a sub-national 
unit. There is potential for Western Australia to develop a more prominent role 
in the Region, and the Commission identified various possibilities at hand.
The Commission concluded that greater regional engagement offered many 
benefits. This includes opportunities for Australia to contribute to addressing 
some of the major challenges in the Region, especially in areas such as food 
security and capacity building. Western Australia in particular has a lot to offer 
and a lot to gain in this respect. 
Themes and Recommendations
A brief account follows of the main themes of each chapter together with the 
Commission’s recommendations. These summaries are underwritten by the 
reasoning and findings presented in the Report including the background 
information and regional perspectives captured in the individual country briefs. 
There is no claim to completeness in these deliberations and neither could 
there be given the complexities involved. The intent was to make a modest 
contribution with a practical intent to the ongoing discussion on Western 
Australia and Australia as partners in the Region’s future trajectories. 
1: Reviewing Asia’s Rise
 Given the high stakes involved, it is essential to understand the key 
dimensions of Asia’s rise, both positive and negative. Asia’s development 
path is likely to be maintained over the next two to three decades so 
that by 2030, if not before, the Region will become the world’s largest 
economic bloc. Asia has become a major driver in the global economy 
offering great opportunities. But there are also enormous challenges 
facing the Region ranging from strategic tensions through to resources 
and environmental pressures. Addressing these challenges has become 
a regional concern. Any examination of the Region’s future needs to 
acknowledge the two sides to Asia’s rise. The Commission’s investigations 
were underpinned by this general insight and guided by the following 
working principles and recommendation: 
 Principle 1
 It is critical to underline the importance of diversity and differences within 
the Region as much as the forces that are more cohesive, collaborative, 
and cooperative. Asia encompasses the world’s most populous and 
most densely populated countries, multiple cultures and ethnicities, 
divergent development paths, and varied political traditions. The 
notion of ‘One Asia’ is misleading and unhelpful. Understanding 
Asia’s diversity is as important as understanding its commonalities and 
shared perspectives.
13
 Principle 2 
 There is a need to build greater enabling capacity in the Region. This 
rests on the view that Asia’s rise should be approached in terms of the 
development of a wider global citizenship as well as sustained economic 
growth. Asia’s rise will indeed be more rounded when Asia assumes 
a greater share of global responsibilities including the expansion of 
developmental assistance, improving governance, transparency, and 
accountability, and fostering sustainable development.
 Recommendation 1 
 While Australia is now an actor in the Region, it has not traditionally 
been seen as part of the Region. To fully realise opportunities, 
Australia needs to see itself more as part of the Region and for its regional 
partners to view it in the same way. Cultural differences need not pose 
immutable barriers in this regard. The principles of mutual respect 
and reciprocity, of taking time to listen and to understand each other, 
can provide the basis on which Australian actors and regional partners 
can develop common practical frameworks to collaborate on specific 
enterprises and concrete problems. 
2: Economic Dynamics in the Asian Region
 21st century Asia is a major developmental success story, having quickly 
closed the development gap between the Region and the rest of the 
world. The structural drivers of this economic growth are ongoing trends, 
feeding expectations that the Region’s growth performance will continue 
for the foreseeable future. There are also challenges facing the Region 
that pose risks to this performance including transitions in national 
development models, demographic pressures and socio-economic 
inequality. While these challenges are formidable they are by no means 
insurmountable. New policies and strategies will need to be devised to 
ensure these challenges do not derail Asia’s ongoing performance. 
 Economic interdependency
 Australia and Western Australia are already hard wired into the Asian 
region. This brings with it the benefits of regional economic prosperity 
but also the associated risks and problems. Being an economic player in 
the Region means that Australia’s future prospects are inextricably linked 
to the Region’s. This reality is not fully appreciated in some policy circles 
and sections of the wider Australian community. 
 Recommendation 2
 Government, business and policy leaders need to increase efforts to 
better inform industry and the wider community of Australia’s interests 
and future prospects within the Region. These undertakings should 
emphasise regional societal challenges, shared environments and a 
common public interest, as well as the economic opportunities. 
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 Recommendation 3
 Further efforts also need to be made to raise awareness about Australia 
in the Region, how its economy is connected into other regional 
economies, how it shares common challenges, and how greater 
regional engagement can assist in addressing these challenges. This 
would include consideration of how Australia wishes to be known in 
the Region and the appropriate ways that this could be projected. 
 Australia’s trade profile
 Australia’s economic relations with Asia have deepened over the last 
five decades but remain narrow. Australia’s trade profile is concentrated 
heavily in four areas: mining, agriculture, education and tourism. 
Reliance on a narrow band of export sectors poses risks, and overly 
exposes the economy to external shocks.
 Recommendation 4
 Government needs to further pursue strategies to diversify the Australian 
economy with a strong focus on regional opportunities. This should 
entail the necessary policy settings to encourage investment 
in underdeveloped export industries and areas of international 
competitiveness. Diversification of exports is necessary to reduce 
exposure to external shocks. Development of the services export 
sector is an important aspect to achieving this aim.
 Foreign investment
 Australia’s foreign investment profile is skewed. Its regional investment 
relationships are underdeveloped, both inwards and outwards. There 
is also a marked sectoral bias towards mining and financial services in 
Australia’s foreign direct investment stocks. These are critical matters that 
need to be more prominent on the public agenda. 
 Recommendation 5
 The Australian economy would benefit considerably from both a 
geographical and sectoral diversification in its foreign investment 
profile. Foreign investment brings skills, technology, and capital into 
the Australian economy, but a narrow reliance upon a handful of 
countries and industries limits the scope of these benefits. Deepening 
investment ties with Asian partners, and building these in new sectors 
(particularly services and technology) will help Australia integrate 
with global value chains in the Region, opening new commercial 
opportunities beyond the primary industries sector.
 Recommendation 6
 Government and business should consider the use of forums and other 
information platforms to share success stories and cultural learning on 
interregional investment, illustrating how it can develop mutual benefit 
for Western Australia, Australia and regional partners. A key aspect 
in these efforts would be to emphasise the importance in business 
dealings of taking the time to build relationships as a prelude to 
commercial transactions. 
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3: Australia and Regional Trade Integration
 There has been a recent explosion of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs) in the Region. Consistent with this trend, Australia has launched 
negotiations for bilateral FTAs with 10 partners in the Region, of which 
only three have been concluded. Concluding FTAs with important trade 
partners such as Japan, Korea and China could offer significant benefits 
for Australia and Western Australia. But agreements have proved elusive 
to date, as Australia does not have the ‘clout’ to prise open the markets 
of the large economies when bargaining bilaterally. Moreover, interest 
in the Region seems to be moving away from bilateral FTAs to ‘mega-
regional’ FTAs that involve a much larger number of partners. These 
mega-regional FTAs include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
 Recommendation 7
 Australia is one of the few countries that is a member of both the TPP 
and the RCEP. Both agreements present Australia with an important 
opportunity to influence the evolving trade arrangements in the 
Region, in a way that advances the interests of all participants. The 
TPP, which involves major developed countries including Japan and 
the US, has a high level of ambition for the liberalisation of trade in 
services and agriculture. Australia needs to push hard for a high quality 
outcome in the TPP on market access issues in order to improve export 
prospects for Australian agriculture and services industries. 
 Recommendation 8
 The RCEP has a lower level of ambition than the TPP, but it includes 
all of the Region’s major economies. Advancing the RCEP as part of 
a broader strategy for economic integration will serve the interests 
of all economies in the Region, including its least developed nations. 
Australia has a record of leadership in trade negotiations to advance 
the shared interests of developed and developing countries alike. It 
should draw on these capacities and traditions to advance the RCEP in 
a way that serves the interests of all involved. Creative proposals could 
include different time frames for implementation, reflecting the 
different levels of development of its members. 
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4: Resources: Interdependence and Security
 High-speed industrialisation and urbanisation in a range of developing 
economies has meant that the demand for minerals, food and energy 
has grown rapidly. The global resources boom has generated policy 
challenges for many governments in the Region given that—with a few 
exceptions (i.e. Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand)—most countries are net 
resources importers. The boom has threatened the resource security of 
many governments trying to ensure the continuous availability of natural 
resources at reasonable prices. The big resources question confronting 
the Region is how to ensure secure and sustainable access to natural 
resources for the Region’s transforming economies. Deep patterns of 
resource interdependence mean that the issue is intrinsically a regional 
problem that demands regional responses if it is to be effectively 
addressed. 
 Recommendation 9
 Governments in the Region have pursued bilateral trade agreements 
to address resources security, which have helped build trust between 
parties. However, there are limits to how far this approach can 
promote resource security, as it has yet to move beyond dialogue 
processes to deeper forms of policy cooperation. Bilateral FTAs 
and multilateral dialogues offer a foundation but governments 
need to harmonise and coordinate their resources policies though 
intergovernmental cooperation across the Region. 
 Recommendation 10
 As a global resources industry hub, Western Australia has a key role to 
play in addressing the issue of resources security. This is about Western 
Australia not only doing what it already does well, but also doing 
more in this vein. First, it is well placed to substantially expand and 
sustain its supply of minerals, energy and food production well into 
the future. The ongoing delivery of food quality is worthy of special 
mention given the growing market in this area. Second, more can be 
made of Western Australia’s role as a reliable resources supplier in the 
Region, especially by promoting its favourable investment settings of 
resources policy stability and openness. Third, the State’s resources 
expertise has great potential to help build and expand resources 
production in other countries in the Region.
 Recommendation 11
 Given the scale of the problem, it should be emphasised that Western 
Australia can make a very strong contribution to meeting the challenges 
surrounding food security in the Region. In particular, its research and 
technical expertise in such areas as agriculture and veterinary science, 
grains development, water management, environmental sustainability 
and transportation logistics are all key capacities required to improve 
the food security situation. Western Australia is in a prime position 
to help advance capacity building in these areas across the Region 
and there are already research partnerships underway. Government, 
business and the scientific community are urged to pursue this agenda 
with vigour through greater regional collaboration and cooperation. 
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5: Engagement and Diplomacy
 Deepening regional engagement
 While Australia has strong ties in the Region, its engagement with 
regional partners is too often simply transactional. Narrow and shallow 
connections do not sustain mutually beneficial engagement over time. 
Appearing to pursue short-term self-interest does not nurture long-
term reciprocal relations. Greater efforts need to be made to cultivate 
a stronger sense of a shared regional future and the accompanying 
commitments to addressing common problems. Current circumstances are 
ripe for this to occur, but it requires both the elevation of existing efforts 
and the development of new strategies to make it a reality. National and 
subnational governments, as well as non-state actors and agencies, have 
crucial roles to play in enhancing and deepening regional engagement. 
 Recommendation 12
 Governments, as well as leadership in business, education, and civil 
society, need to be careful to avoid complacency in the conduct of 
Australia’s regional relations, especially given that nothing is static in 
the Region. While some nations may loom large at one moment, it 
is important not to forget or take for granted longstanding regional 
relationships. 
 Recommendation 13
 In regional partnerships, government, industry and NGOs should 
undertake the development of professional exchanges and sabbatical 
programs to share and develop good governance practices and 
capacity building in the public and private sectors. The experience 
of pooling knowledge and witnessing how things can be done 
differently is seen to be particularly relevant to addressing the issue of 
corruption, with its negative impacts on conducting business and the 
efficient running of government.
 Recommendation 14
 Schools, universities and research institutions, with the positive aid 
and support of government, should up-scale student exchanges and 
research collaborations and partnerships in the Region. These types of 
regional programs and partnerships have many direct educational 
and research benefits but also deepen a wider sense of common 
purpose and reciprocity. These efforts should also be linked to the 
greater development of alumni and other networks for ongoing 
understanding and mutual benefit. 
 Intergovernmental coordination
 Governments at the subnational level are becoming more involved in 
the facilitation and development of regional engagement, increasingly in 
economic affairs as well as in wider socio-cultural relations. A number of 
Australian state governments have established their own representatives 
and offices in countries in the Region. These offices are able to 
concentrate on the pursuit of state-specific interests, often complemented 
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by the functions of the Australian Commonwealth government’s overseas 
missions. Coordination and cooperation is important between the two 
levels of government to limit duplication and to avoid confusion and 
the potential to send mixed messages, especially in countries unfamiliar 
with Australia’s federal system. There is scope to consider the efficacy of 
current state-federal interaction in this area, and whether things can be 
done better, domestically and in the field. 
 Recommendation 15
 Given the growing involvement of Australian states in the facilitation 
of regional economic engagement there is a need to further develop 
robust state-federal intergovernmental mechanisms to deal with these 
matters in relation to policy and international negotiations as well 
as field operations. These mechanisms would be helpful in the 
advancement of greater cooperation and coordination between 
federal and state governments, especially on trans-border issues such 
as trade, investment, education and the environment. 
6: Western Australia in the Evolving Regional Order
 Western Australia has been a lead player in Australia’s economic 
engagement in the Asian economic miracle. Nonetheless, continuing 
economic prosperity is not a given and needs to be cultivated and 
propagated. Western Australia’s edge in resources is an extraordinarily 
vibrant base for the development of the State, especially with Perth as 
a global resources industry hub. Western Australia also has strengths 
in other sectors that have enormous potential for growth. The state 
government has a part to play in realising this, as does the private sector, 
both domestic and international. 
 Recommendation 16
 There is an ongoing need to emphasise and promote the fact that 
Western Australia is already an active player in the regional economy. This 
should be integral to all policy and strategic economic thinking in 
government and business about how to make the most of existing and 
new opportunities. 
 Recommendation 17
 There is a need to pursue greater diversification of the Western Australia 
economy. This involves a realisation of the great opportunities on offer 
in the further development of the high value-add sectors of economic 
activity and where Western Australia can potentially be internationally 
competitive. It also entails an appreciation of the potential benefits to 
be made through joint ventures and foreign investment flows in the 
Region to develop existing and new areas of economic opportunities. 
A prime candidate here is the strength of Western Australia’s 
knowledge economy including its scientific research and technical 
expertise, and how this fits with regional demand and problems. 
This presses the need for far greater investment in research and 
development through partnerships and collaborations with other 
universities, research institutions and businesses in the Region.
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 Recommendation 18
 There is great scope and mutual benefit for Western Australia to intensify 
its connections in the Region. There are many existing business links, 
government-to-government relations, university and people-to-
people connections into the Region that can be further developed. 
The learning of Asian languages, student exchanges, and various 
forms of cultural engagement, all help to increase understanding 
and connectivity. Moreover, increasing knowledge in the wider 
community about the Region and Australia’s place therein is essential 
to advancing this agenda.
 Recommendation 19
 The development of the international agenda of higher education and 
its ability to increase regional connectivity is paramount. The gains are 
multiple ranging from the people-to people dimensions through 
to core aspects of knowledge economy development. This can be 
realised through student exchanges and internships, joint badging 
of degrees with universities in the Region (to produce ‘regional-
global’ graduates), the mutual benefits of research collaborations 
and partnerships, and the merits of alumni and other network 
mechanisms. 
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The First Murdoch Commission
Introduction
In early 2012 the Vice Chancellor of Murdoch University, Professor Richard 
Higgott initiated plans for an independent commission of inquiry into Western 
Australia’s prospects in the Asian region. Formalised as the First Murdoch 
Commission, the inquiry was charged with investigating how Western Australia 
was connected into the development patterns of the Region, and what 
opportunities and challenges were involved. 
The starting point of the Commission was that Western Australia is already a 
significant economic player in the Region as a major exporter of minerals and 
energy. However, a key aspect of the Commission’s intent was to think about 
Western Australia’s regional role as ‘more than a quarry’ supplying resource-
hungry developing economies. The first intuition was that Western Australia’s 
wider capacities and expertise were also important and not just the resources 
story. 
The framing of the Commission and the recruitment of commissioners were 
undertaken during 2012. At this time the Australian government’s Australia in 
the Asian Century White Paper was released (October 2012). The White Paper 
prompted wide public discussion on Australia’s place in the Region, and this 
provided background context for the specific investigations of the Commission. 
The formal deliberations of the Commission began in Perth with a meeting 
of commissioners in February 2013. Further meetings and consultation were 
held in several regional locations as well as in Australia across an eight-month 
period. The Commission Secretariat at Murdoch University provided research 
and logistical support, and coordinated the drafting and production of the 
Commission’s Final Report.
The various dimensions of the Commission’s mode of operation can be detailed 
as follows. 
Brief
•	 The	core	brief	of	the	Commission	was	to	investigate	how	economic	
engagement and interdependency of Western Australia, Australia and 
the Region could be pursued to enhance mutual benefit and long-term 
resilience. 
•	 This	task	included	highlighting	some	of	the	most	relevant	issues	and	
challenges that are likely to emerge in Asia over the next decade or so. 
The intent was that our findings and assessments would contribute to the 
broader aim of sustaining regional prosperity and stability. 
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Constitution
•	 The	Commission	was established first and foremost as a regional endeavour. 
This is reflected in the membership of the Commission, which includes 
leading experts and opinion leaders from major Asian economies 
along with commissioners from Western Australia and Australia. The 
Commission also advanced this regional focus through its meetings and 
consultations undertaken in the Region. 
•	 The	Commission	was	to	act	as	an international and independent inquiry. 
The business of the Commission was conducted on the basis of 
intellectual freedom and evidence-based analysis. While the Commission 
was initiated by Murdoch University, its proceedings and investigations 
were undertaken without constraint from the University or any other 
interested parties such as government or business. 
Aims
•	 To	identify	and	examine	common	challenges	facing	Western	Australia,	
Australia and the Region in the coming decade. 
•	 To	develop	recommendations	to	advance	economic	growth	and	wider	
social development in Western Australia, Australia and the Region.
•	 To	consider	how	resilience	and	mutuality	can	be	cultivated	in	the	Region	
in the context of growing economic interdependency.
Methodology
The Commission’s investigations were undertaken across 2013. From the start, 
there was a strong sense that if the recommendations of the inquiry were to 
have policy credibility and traction both in Australia and in the Region, then the 
Commission would need to conduct its deliberations as an enterprise grounded 
in the Region. This was aided by the fact that the members of Commission 
were recruited from government, business and academia from around the Asian 
region as well as within Australia.2
The Commission schedule included sittings in Perth, Jakarta, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Seoul, Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra. In its meetings around the Region, the 
Commission consulted with a wide range of agencies and policy leaders from 
government, business, academia, media, NGOs and community groups. In 
many of the destinations, the Commission conducted roundtable sessions 
with groups of emerging leaders seeking their views about their own nation’s 
development prospects and societal challenges, as well as how they viewed 
regional engagement and integration. 
The Commission received support and cooperation from Commonwealth and 
Western Australian government officials both offshore and onshore, which 
was greatly appreciated. It was given detailed briefings from the Australian 
embassies (and High Commission) in each of the regional locations. The Western 
Australian overseas state offices also provided local briefings as well as generous 
assistance with contacts and logistics.
2 All members of the Commission served as individuals and not in any representational capacity. The 
Commission’s Final Report and recommendations reflect an overall consensus on the part of the Commissioners 
without assuming all of them agree with each and every statement contained in it.
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The regional meetings, consultations and follow-up communications were an 
essential part of the Commission’s investigation, providing invaluable insight 
and evidence for the Commission’s findings. These were conducted generally on 
the basis of non-attribution, especially on certain sensitive issues.
In terms of substantive focus, the scope of the inquiry encompassed the ASEAN 
+6 group of nations (referred to in the Report as ‘the Region’).3 The timeframe 
considered was a five-year period coupled with some longer-term scenario 
projections ranging from the optimistic to worst case. The key themes of the 
Commission’s deliberations included: Asia’s rise, economic dynamics; trade 
integration; resources; diplomacy; and Western Australia in the Region. 
Note on individual country briefs
The country briefs present material on each of the five major countries that the 
Commission visited. The order of presentation in the text is indicative of the 
Commission’s meeting schedule across the Region. Each brief contains some 
basic statistical information on the specific country including certain indicators 
of connectivity with Australia. They also provide snapshots of the issues raised in 
the regional consultations and meetings including people’s concerns about local 
prospects and challenges, and wider regional trends. This input is deliberately 
not attributed to individuals. The emerging leaders groups in the various 
locations particularly impressed the Commissioners with their candid views on 
current problems combined with a relative optimism about the future.
  3 The capitalized term ‘the Region’ is used through out the Report to refer to the ASEAN+6 group of countries: 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, plus China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
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Chapter 1
Reviewing Asia’s Rise
The stakes have seldom been higher in understanding the drivers behind Asia’s 
rise, both positive and negative. There is every reason to believe that Asia’s 
development path is likely to be maintained over the next two to three decades 
so that by 2030, if not before, greater Asia will become the world’s largest 
economic bloc. Yet for all of the positive dimensions of the unprecedented 
transformation of the Region, it is equally true that it faces a range of significant 
challenges, political, economic, environmental, and social in character.
Asia’s future trajectories have critical implications not only for the countries 
in the Region but the broader international system. It is thus imperative to 
understand the diverse forces and trends that are shaping Asia’s emerging 
contours. The so-called ‘Asian miracle’ is complex and by no means an 
homogenous story. Undoubtedly, Asia’s global position in the 21st century 
marks a significant transformation in world politics and economics. However, 
the very success of Asia’s rise has ushered in changes that are multifaceted, 
generating new challenges as well as successes.
Asia’s Rise
The last decades have seen the connections within and between the community 
of Asian nations, including Australia and Western Australia, expand and 
deepen. This engagement has opened up great opportunities in the economy 
and beyond. But it is also prudent to consider the challenges and uncertainties 
that this increasing connection brings. The Commission was established to 
investigate these issues from a regional perspective precisely because Australia’s 
core interests are closely intertwined with Asia’s continuing prosperity, security, 
and stability. A first step in the investigation was to examine more closely the 
preconceptions underlying what appears to be an overall assumption that Asia’s 
rise is not only sustainable, but is sustainable at its current rate.
In this regard, it is critical to underline the importance of diversity and differences 
within the Region as much as the forces that are more cohesive, collaborative, and 
cooperative. Asia encompasses the world’s most populous and most densely 
populated countries, multiple cultures and ethnicities, divergent development 
paths, and varied political traditions. The notion of a “One Asia” or a “Singular 
Asia” is misleading and unhelpful. Understanding Asia’s diversity is as important 
as understanding its commonalities and shared perspectives.
Equally important is the recognition that there is a need to build greater 
enabling capacity in the Region. This rests on the view that Asia’s rise should 
be approached in terms of the development of a wider global citizenship as well 
as sustained economic growth. Asia’s rise will indeed be more rounded when 
Asia assumes a greater share of global responsibilities including the expansion 
of developmental assistance, improving governance, transparency, and 
accountability, and fostering sustainable development.
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It is reasonably uncontroversial to state that Asia is not just rising but in fact, has 
arisen. Yet there is nothing immutable about this. Success has also triggered 
trends that will likely present major challenges in the years and decades ahead. 
Western Australia and Australia are now ‘hard-wired’ into the Region, and 
many regional challenges are now common problems. Asia’s rise has become a 
major driver in the global economy. But it is important to remember that some 
of world’s great challenges—e.g. food security, energy and resources supply, 
poverty alleviation, and environmental degradation—are writ large in the Asian 
region. Addressing these challenges has become a regional and global concern.
Australia and Western Australia in 21st Century Asia
Asia’s rise encompasses shifts across the international system including 
the shaping of new global and regional balances, and the development of 
new national strategies by many nation-states around the world. So far, the 
overwhelming narrative associated with Asia’s rise has been a positive one. 
Many of the Region’s key economies such as China and India have experienced 
unprecedented economic growth. Asian economies today trade more with 
ASEAN members than the European Union. 
Asia’s recent economic performance has placed it among the central drivers of 
the global economy. Most economists believe that Asia is going to become the 
world’s largest economic region by GDP in 2030 surpassing North America and 
Western Europe. By 2018, Asia is expected to account for 30 per cent of world 
GDP (see Figure 1) increasing to more than 50 per cent by mid-century. From a 
historical perspective, this marks a return to the situation prior to the European 
Industrial Revolution when China and India were the world’s largest economies. 
Figure 1: Distribution of world GDP (PPP) by region, 1992-2018
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 
25
However, this is more than a story about economics. It also hails increasing 
levels of connectivity in the Region more generally. As a consequence, the 
long-term prosperity and future shape of Australia and Western Australia 
is increasingly intertwined with the trajectory of Asia. In this regard, a 
21st century Australia needs to see itself as an integral part of the Region, 
economically, politically and socially. 
Australia and Western Australia are well placed in Asia’s rise given its 
geographical proximity to the Region along with its rich endowment of 
resources, mature education and services sectors, and world-class science 
and technology capabilities. Australia has well-developed relations with the 
major economies in the Region but there is a great deal of scope for these to 
be significantly enhanced and diversified. This extends beyond critical trade 
relations and emphasises how Australia’s national security is becoming more 
directly interconnected with security in Asia. The need to maintain stability 
in the Indo-Pacific and in South East Asia is paramount not only to Australia’s 
security interests but to its more general prosperity. Moreover, sustainable 
prosperity and mutual benefit requires deep and ongoing broad engagement 
between peoples and communities across the Region. 
Reality Check
One of the net effects of Asia’s rise is that the world order by 2030 is projected 
to be a multipolar one. According to the US National Intelligence Council’s 
Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds report (NIC 2012), no hegemonic power 
is likely to dominate the international system by the year 2030.i On the plus 
side, the report cautiously forecasts that great power conflict is going to become 
much less likely given that ‘too much would be at stake’ although the ‘risks of 
interstate conflict are increasing owing to changes in the international system.’ 
For key regional powers like Australia that have long-standing ties with the 
United States, the stakes of a reconfigured world order could be significant, 
especially with the US’s diminished willingness and ability to serve as a global 
security provider. 
For nearly four decades, Asia has been devoid of a major conflict and instead 
pursued a path of unparalleled socio-economic development. This is a major 
departure when compared to the overall state of Asian affairs from the late 19th 
century to the mid-20th century, which was marked by decaying and ultimately 
collapsing dynasties, the worst vestiges of imperialism and colonialism, brutal 
occupations, wars and conflicts, and endemic poverty. While the Region has 
experienced two significant wars since the end of World War II—in Korea and 
Vietnam—the number of conflicts that have been fought globally and in Asia 
have fallen sharply since the end of the Cold War.
Asia’s remarkable transformation over the past four decades is all the more 
surprising since regional stability has been maintained through a combination 
of bilateral alliances, multilateral cooperative networks such as ASEAN, nascent 
multilateral security mechanisms such as the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, and other “mini-laterals.” Given the 
virtually unimaginable consequences and opportunity costs arising from the 
outbreak of major hostilities and the potential reversal of decades of economic 
growth and progress, there is every reason to sustain stability in Asia. 
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Yet despite the absence of wars since the mid-1970s and significant economic 
progress, it is also evident that Asia faces a range of political, security, and 
governance challenges. How Asia copes with these challenges will have global 
repercussions given Asia’s ascendency in the 21st century. As Australia and 
Western Australia seek to maximise mutually beneficial engagement with Asia, 
prioritising collaborative and cooperative strategies that can jointly mitigate, 
prevent, and even resolve these types of challenges will become increasingly 
important in the years ahead.
In this light, the Commission considers that any examination of the Region’s 
future must acknowledge a number of key realities, many of which require 
a collaborative approach to realise potential benefits and to mitigate the 
downsides:
Strategic tensions
Asia is home to some of the world’s most pronounced historical, territorial 
and security disputes and continuing strategic rivalry, including on-going 
competition between the two Koreas, territorial disputes between Japan and 
Russia, China and Japan, and Korea and Japan. The possibilities of a more stable 
and cooperative Asia depend crucially on its ability to redress such long-lasting 
historical legacies. There is also the issue of growing strategic competition 
between China and the US.
Political and governance gaps
There are also challenges surrounding political and institutional development 
in the Region including uneven political development, struggling political 
systems, the spectre of fragile states, human rights deficiencies, corruption, and 
governance gaps. In several cases, significant economic growth is occurring but 
with ongoing problems in these areas. If political and governance deficits are 
not addressed, they are bound to recoil on economic performance in negative 
ways, quite aside from the inherent merits of responsive and accountable 
political institutions and good governance practices. 
Socio-economic inequality
Recent economic progress has given rise to significant expansion in the 
number of people classified as middle class in the Region. However, there are 
also sharpening inequalities in income and opportunity emerging within and 
between specific countries in the Region. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
has recently highlighted this problem, noting that while poverty levels have 
declined across the developing economies the yields of economic growth have 
not been evenly distributed between rich and poor.ii Income inequality is also 
implicated with inequality of opportunity creating a vicious cycle where one 
reinforces the other. 
Demographic pressures 
There are significant and contrasting demographic trends in the Region. On 
the one hand, developed countries such as Japan, South Korea and China are 
rapidly becoming ageing societies, as falling birth rates and increasing life 
expectancy increases the share of the elderly in their demographic structures. 
On the other hand, developing sub-regions such as South Asia will see huge 
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population surges well into 2030 and beyond. Both demographic trends 
beckon unprecedented social welfare, health care, education, and environmental 
challenges, placing economic prosperity and political institutions under stress. 
Resources security and environmental challenges 
Asia’s rapid growth has generated escalating demands on natural resources and 
on the human and natural environment. A key concern for the Region is how to 
secure life’s fundamentals such as food, water, clean air, and energy, as well as 
securing an ongoing supply of resources for industry. The massive urbanisation 
underway in the Region alone poses enormous pressures. In this regard, the 
pursuit of economic growth is now increasingly also a task of how to ensure the 
ongoing viability of its various supporting environments including the human 
and ecological habitat. Thus, reconciling non-traditional security issues with 
sustainable development is a major challenge facing the Region in the 21st 
century.
Future Scenarios
Predicting potential pathways for the Region over the next decade or so, even 
up to 2030, is fraught with difficulty. Clearly, some basic variables are likely to 
remain fairly constant or within credible ranges such as demographic trends, 
the continuing urbanisation of major Asian countries, the continuing growth in 
China’s hard power capabilities, and the Region’s growing importance in the 
global economy. Indeed, any attempt to forecast the direction of the Region 
needs to also consider the wider global trends and their impact on Asia’s 
potential futures. The growing dependence of the major Asian economies 
on world markets, major shifts in global economic output, and the health 
of the global financial system are all likely to have significant impacts on 
the performance of regional economies. Equally, key global issues such as 
environmental pressures, demographic trends, and food and energy security 
cannot but influence the shaping of Asian futures. On the geo-political front, 
global shifts in power relations are very much evident in the Region and how 
these are played out will have significant impact on its future shape. The 
alternative future scenarios outlined below are cognisant of these global trends.
The Commission considered it important to generate a set of scenarios to 
project a sense that the near future in the Region is relatively open with 
varying degrees of risk. The three scenarios are cast in the form of alternative 
possibilities in a range extending from optimistic, through middling, to 
pessimistic. There is no attempt to present these as hard and fast probability 
distributions but rather to suggest credible potential alternatives to envisage a 
sense of the future. 
 1. An economically robust and politically stable Asia with 
manageable security challenges.
 Despite competition for resources, this is the most optimal scenario and 
the most promising. This works on the assumptions that the Region is 
able to tackle and manage key political and security challenges, that the 
Region’s major economies are able to grow at respectable levels, and that 
they can mitigate, perhaps even resolve key social and environmental 
challenges. At the macro level, a key precondition is the ability of the 
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US and China to forge and to sustain a relationship that while fully 
competitive, is also mindful of the need for their critical collaboration 
on major issues in the Region. Such a scenario also assumes that 
political and economic reforms will continue to be made by regional 
players so that chances of domestic volatility will be mitigated through 
improvements in political and socio-economic arrangements.
 2. Decelerating growth rates in the Region’s major economies 
with mounting socio-political challenges.
 This scenario is more brittle and potentially disruptive than the first 
given that the primary driver is the faltering of economic growth in 
the Region’s key powerhouses of China, Japan, India, and South Korea. 
Japan and South Korea already face much slower growth rates than 
the emerging economies and also confront key social changes such as 
rapidly ageing societies compounded by falling birth rates. China is also 
approaching a demographic conundrum marked by an aging population 
and shrinking work force, a consequence of both a lower birth rate and 
its one-child policy. In the longer term, this presents China with the huge 
problem of how to meet its own labour market demand. However in the 
shorter term, a flattening in the economic growth rate would result in 
rising political and social tensions, a growing income gap between urban 
and rural sectors, and the side effects of the unprecedented urbanisation 
underway. Conversely, decelerating economic growth for a developing 
economy like Indonesia will face similar issues but in the reverse in the 
long term given the demographic problem of a youthful population. 
 3. Growing great power competition, heightened geopolitical 
instability, and intensified security complications.
 This more pessimistic scenario for Asia suggests a return in coming years 
to intensified great power competition (including military competition) 
and a failure to adequately manage outstanding historical and territorial 
issues. It assumes that enhancing military capabilities will continue to 
be a major dimension of regional security arrangements: the wider 
region hosts the top five of the world’s largest conventional armed 
forces, and six states with nuclear weapons (the US, China, Russia, India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea). This scenario would be compounded by 
intensified maritime competition spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 
in which military ambition and trade considerations could be difficult 
to disentangle. This intensified power play could also have destabilising 
effects on already fragile regimes in the Region with a significant 
impact on economic activity, especially in curtailing the development of 
economic trade and integration. 
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Summary
The issues raised in this chapter generated the following propositions as working 
principles and a general recommendation, which underlay the Commission’s 
more specific recommendations.
 Principle 1
 It is critical to underline the importance of diversity and differences within 
the Region as much as the forces that are more cohesive, collaborative, and 
cooperative. Asia encompasses the world’s most populous and most 
densely populated countries, multiple cultures and ethnicities, divergent 
development paths, and varied political traditions. The notion of ‘One 
Asia’ is misleading and unhelpful. Understanding Asia’s diversity is as 
important as understanding its commonalities and shared perspectives.
 Principle 2 
 There is a need to build greater enabling capacity in the Region. This 
rests on the view that Asia’s rise should be approached in terms of the 
development of a wider global citizenship as well as sustained economic 
growth. Asia’s rise will indeed be more rounded when Asia assumes 
a greater share of global responsibilities including the expansion of 
developmental assistance, improving governance, transparency, and 
accountability, and fostering sustainable development.
 Recommendation 1 
 While Australia is now an actor in the Region, it has not traditionally 
been seen as part of the Region. To fully realise opportunities, Australia 
needs to see itself more as part of the Region and for its regional partners 
to view it in the same way. Cultural differences need not pose immutable 
barriers in this regard. The principles of mutual respect and reciprocity, of 
taking time to listen and to understand each other, can provide the basis 
on which Australian actors and regional partners can develop common 
practical frameworks to collaborate on specific enterprises and concrete 
problems. 
The Commission has conducted its inquiries on the basis that the 
most probable Asian future is somewhere between scenario one 
and two. It firmly believes that whilst likely, better outcomes will 
only eventuate if the appropriate strategic choices are made. The 
recommendations of the Commission hope to make a contribution 
to informing such choices.  
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Country brief: 
INDONESIA
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world with a large 
proportion of its population under 25 years of age. It is the world’s 16th 
largest economy (in nominal GDP terms) and its economic growth rate over 
the last decade has been above the world average. Indonesia is a democracy 
that traverses an extensive archipelago with a multi-ethnic and multi-faith 
constituency. It has an active civil society and a vibrant media. Since the 
abdication of President Suharto, there has been a program to devolve power to 
the provinces and districts though this has not been without problems including 
issues with policy harmonisation. As near neighbours, there have been tensions 
between Australia and Indonesia at times. Nonetheless, much has been achieved 
in relation to intergovernmental, defence, educational and economic links. Deep 
and consistent commitment by both nations will foster the ongoing health of 
the relationship. 
In its meetings and consultations in Jakarta, the Commission heard from a 
range of voices on Indonesia’s current situation and future prospects, and how 
Australia and Western Australia may figure in these considerations. The following 
provides some snapshots of these views.
Human Development Index (2012)
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Challenges
•	 Indonesia	takes	its	position	in	the	Asian	region	seriously	and	provides	a	
strong regional leadership role in ASEAN. It also has internal challenges 
to negotiate given its archipelagic geography, uneven economic patterns, 
and cultural diversity. These domestic challenges are highly demanding 
and tend to dominate the political and policy space. 
•	 Corruption	and	issues	around	upholding	the	rule	of	law	continue	to	
trouble the operations of Indonesian society. These are longstanding 
matters and efforts to address the problem have to try to break through 
deeply entrenched habits and institutional failings. Nonetheless, there is a 
general sense that things have improved in the new democratic era.
•	 These	issues	relate	to	the	bigger	challenge	of	capacity	building	in	
Indonesia generally. The devolution agenda in particular is attempting 
to empower communities yet there are often significant knowledge and 
capability deficits at the local level that can hinder these efforts. 
•	 Economic	development	has	generated	major	infrastructure	and	
environmental pressures that are having adverse effects on the people’s 
everyday lives especially in big cities like Jakarta. The magnitude and 
complexity of these problems makes it difficult to rally sufficient will to 
begin to redress the situation. 
Direct flights to Jakarta
• From Sydney: 8 per week 
• From Melbourne: 5 per week 
• From Perth: 9 per week
Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiations commenced 
September 2012; both Australia 
and Indonesia are parties to the 
ASEAN-ANZ-FTA
PTA/FTA
Air 
2.3%
12,909
11,186
Indonesian students in Australia

of total Australian trade
Two-way 
merchandise 
trade, 2012 (A$m)
Education
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On Australia and Western Australia
•	 While	there	is	some	awareness	of	Australia	in	Indonesia,	little	is	known	
about Western Australia unless there is some personal connection via 
family, business or education. In general there is a lack of coverage and 
low levels of general information about Australia and Western Australia, 
in the Indonesian news and on social media.
•	 A	number	of	interlocutors	noted	that	many	Australians’	perceptions	
of Indonesia are often outdated, with little knowledge of Indonesia’s 
democratic reform since the late 1990s and the country’s recent 
economic growth performance. This indicates the need for Australians 
to become better informed about contemporary Indonesia and its 
aspirations as a democratic nation. 
•	 There	is	a	sense	that	in	commercial	matters	Australians	can	tend	to	be	
overly focused on simply expediting a deal. Australian businesses need 
to appreciate the importance of building relationships in their interactions 
with Indonesian partners, and not act in a purely transactional manner. 
•	 The	experiences	of	Indonesian	students	studying	in	Australia	have	been	
positive, and the friendships and professional links these establish make 
for longstanding relationships into the future. A good deal more could 
be done to further develop alumni and other networks to enhance and 
support these kinds of links.
Emerging leaders perspectives
•	 The	emerging	leaders	reiterated	concerns	about	corruption,	rule	of	law,	
environmental stresses, inequalities and the challenges of an archipelagic 
democracy. While increased democratisation and the devolution of 
certain governing responsibilities to more local levels can help to 
overcome the legacies of dictatorial rule, Jakarta and Java tend to remain 
the power centre.
•	 Shortfalls	in	the	education	system	were	identified	as	a	common	
denominator to many of these issues. Among other things it tends to 
inhibit critical thinking about how to improve modes of governance and 
policymaking. Positive change is possible but requires the development 
of new educational models designed to support and deliver optimal 
growth and development across Indonesian society, especially at the 
provincial and local levels. In addition, addressing education shortfalls 
and disparity was linked to bridging the gap between the haves and 
have-nots. 
•	 A	number	of	emerging	leaders	expressed	confidence	in	the	positive	
effects of ASEAN economic integration. This was linked to the pressing 
need for Indonesia to integrate economically itself. As an archipelagic 
country, Indonesia needs to integrate its outlying locations with the 
economic powerhouse of Java. 
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•	 Australia	is	gradually	being	drawn	into	the	Region	and	is	thus	becoming	
regarded increasingly as part of Asia. Many of Indonesia’s current leaders 
were educated in Australia and this bodes well for deepening ties 
between Australia and Indonesia. However, more can be done to develop 
engagement between the wider populations of Indonesia and Australia. 
Interaction at subnational levels, governmental and societal was seen to 
be helpful in this regard as would increasing educational and cultural 
exchanges of younger generations between Western Australia and 
Indonesia.
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Chapter 2
Economic Dynamics in the 
Asian Region
Asia is perhaps the greatest economic success story of the late 20th century. 
Though a poor and relatively under-developed region in the 1950s, Asian 
economies quickly emerged as some of the fastest growing in the world 
economy. Industrialisation, urbanisation and human development has continued 
largely unabated for five decades in many countries. These trends have seen 
Asian countries quickly close the development gap between themselves and the 
rest of the world, placing the Region at the centre of the contemporary global 
economy. 
This ‘economic rise of Asia’ has also created significant opportunities for 
Australia, which has utilised its geographical proximity and natural resource 
endowments to become a leading supplier of food, resources, education and 
tourism services to rapidly growing Asian markets. But why have regional 
economies been able to grow and modernise at such high rates? How have 
Asian economic dynamics affected the ways in which Australia has become 
enmeshed in the region? And what factors will determine whether Asia’s 
past economic achievements will continue into the future? In this chapter, we 
examine the contours and structural drivers behind the economic rise of Asia, 
consider how the Australian economy has become deeply – but narrowly – 
connected to partners in the region, and explore the developmental challenges 
facing Asian economies in coming years.
The Asian Economic Miracle 
The rise of Asia is a historical phenomenon that rests upon economic 
foundations. The growing political influence and importance of Asian countries 
within the international system is intimately connected with their collective 
success in navigating the process of economic development. At the end of 
the Second World War (WW2), the region was in poor shape economically: 
Northeast Asian countries were badly damaged and in need of reconstruction, 
while Southeast Asia was occupied with the political transition from colonial rule 
and the establishment of independent governments and new political systems. 
But from the late 1950s the Region gradually began a process of high-speed 
economic growth, modernisation and industrialisation, which has become 
known as the ‘Asian economic miracle’. Within two generations, this miracle had 
completely transformed many Asian countries, and catapulted them to a leading 
position in international affairs.
The Asian economic miracle proceeded through a series of stages, as country 
after country sequentially experienced an economic take-off. The first was 
Japan which, after a period of reconstruction following WW2, began a period 
of high-speed growth in the late 1950s. The Japanese miracle soon spread 
outwards across the Region, with the ‘Asian Tigers’ (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong 
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Kong and Korea) experiencing their own economic take-offs in the mid-1960s. 
These countries were then joined by the so-called ‘Tiger Cubs’ (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) in the 1980s, by which time the miracle 
had expanded to also encompass Southeast Asia. Its regional diffusion was 
completed in the 1990s, when countries undertaking post-socialist economic 
reforms (China, Vietnam and India) began their own periods of high-speed 
growth. The dynamics of the Asian economic miracle varies across nations, with 
high-speed growth taking off – and subsequently slowing – at different times in 
different economies. The overall story is one of high and sustainable economic 
growth, which since the 1960s has consistently outperformed the global 
average (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Asian economic growth rates, 1965-2012
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Two consequences have followed from Asia’s four decades of world-beating 
economic performance. First, there has been a dramatic developmental ‘catch-
up’ between the Region and the rest of the world, with per capita gross national 
income in Asia rising from 44 per cent of the global average in 1980 to 91 
per cent by 2012. Second, Asia’s weight in the world economy has markedly 
increased, with its share of global GDP increasing from 15 per cent to 29 per 
cent over the same period.iii Contemporary forecasts expect Asia’s share of the 
global economy will rise to around 50 per cent by 2050 – the key figure upon 
which claims that the 21st century will be the ‘Asian Century’ are typically 
based. However, these analyses often overlook the fact that the Asian economic 
miracle has not simply produced quantitatively high economic growth rates. It 
has also catalysed three qualitative transformations in the economic and social 
structures of countries in the region: industrialisation, urbanisation and rapid 
human development.
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Industrialisation as primary driver
The primary driver behind high-speed economic growth in Asia has been 
industrialisation. Few Asian countries have sizeable or high quality endowments 
of natural resources, and development has therefore been based upon a 
transition from economic structures dominated by primary sectors to those 
focussed upon manufacturing. Across the Region, this transition was typically 
started by export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) – the building of labour-
intensive manufacturing industries (such as textiles and consumer goods) 
oriented to Western markets by attracting foreign direct investment. 
This was followed by a process of ‘moving up the value chain,’ where 
successively more advanced sectors such as technology products (electronics), 
heavy industries (steel, petrochemicals) and complex manufactures 
(automobiles, machinery and aerospace) were progressively established. There 
was a regional dynamic to this process, as industries gradually migrated across 
countries as developmental levels and patterns of comparative advantage 
changed. Industrial migration was particularly seen in the textiles industry, 
which moved from Japan to the Asian Tigers in the 1960s, before shifting again 
to the Tiger Cubs and China in the 1980s. This process allowed Asian economies 
to gradually transition from lower to higher value-added manufacturing sectors, 
exploiting new export and investment attraction opportunities at each stage in 
the chain.
Urbanisation
Industrialisation in turn drove a process of urbanisation in Asian societies. 
The growth of manufacturing industries demanded the expansion of large 
cities, with hundreds of millions of people moving from rural areas to seek 
employment in new urban conurbations. In Southeast Asia, urbanisation rates 
increased from 25 per cent in 1980 to 44 per cent by 2010, while in China 
they rose from 19 to 49 per cent over the same period. The overall urban 
population of East Asia rose by 700 million in the three decades to 2010, of 
which two-thirds was accounted for by China alone.iv This process facilitated 
major improvements to economic infrastructure such as transport and utilities 
which were built as cities grew. It also increased the quality of and access to 
social services (e.g. education, housing and healthcare) that are more easily 
delivered in concentrated urban areas. The establishment of industrial centres in 
turn supported the growth process by facilitating ‘economics of agglomeration’, 
where related industries that develop in close proximity to each other – for 
example, the steel, machinery and automobiles sectors – mutually reinforce 
each other’s development.
High-speed growth, industrialisation and urbanisation have all combined to see 
levels of human development in Asia leap forward. Major improvements have 
occurred across the region in terms of health, nutrition, housing standards, 
educational attainment, poverty reduction and access to information and social 
connectivity. The United Nations Development Program’s Human Development 
Index (HDI), a composite measure of health, education and income data, 
succinctly illuminates the contours of the process. The HDI scores of all Asian 
countries have increased since the 1980s, and the Region as a whole has 
improved at twice the rate of the global average. These improvements in human 
development has also led to the phenomena of the ‘rising middle class’ – 
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increasingly wealthy groups within Asian societies whose economic resources 
allow them to demand better nutrition, housing, healthcare, education and 
social services.
Table 1: Human Development Index in Asian countries, 1980-2010
1980 1990 2000 2010 Increase 1990-2010
Cambodia 0.444 0.532
China 0.407 0.495 0.590 0.689 39%
India 0.345 0.410 0.463 0.547 33%
Indonesia 0.422 0.479 0.540 0.620 30%
Japan 0.788 0.837 0.878 0.909 9%
Korea 0.640 0.749 0.839 0.905 21%
Malaysia 0.563 0.635 0.712 0.763 20%
Philippines 0.561 0.581 0.610 0.649 12%
Singapore 0.756 0.826 0.892 18%
Thailand 0.490 0.569 0.625 0.686 21%
Vietnam 0.439 0.534 0.611 39%
East Asia & Pacific 0.432 0.502 0.584 0.673 34%
World 0.561 0.600 0.639 0.690 15%
Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Reports Database
Economic interdependence
Asian economies have not achieved these developmental successes on their 
own. Rather, there has been a decidedly regional flavour to Asian economic 
miracle. It is no coincidence that countries in the Region have grown together, 
as the miracle has relied upon mutually supportive patterns of interdependence 
between economies, reinforced by political structures that have deepened 
regional economic integration.
The rapid pace of Asian industrialisation was made possible by patterns 
of complementarity between economies. Broadly, the Region is home to 
three distinct types of economy, which support each other by performing 
differentiated economic roles. First are the advanced industrial economies 
– Japan, Korea and Singapore – which provide the region access to capital, 
technical expertise and important commercial and technological services. 
Second are the industrialising economies of China and Southeast Asia, which 
have ample supplies of labour and are home to the bulk of the Region’s 
manufacturing capacity. Third are resource countries – such as Australia, 
Indonesia and Thailand – which fulfil an important role in supplying resource-
poor countries with the necessary minerals, energy and food to sustain 
industrialisation and urbanisation. Complementarity between these three groups 
has led to deep patterns of trade and investment in the region, and has allowed 
the economies to specialise in areas where their comparative advantages are the 
greatest. Interdependence in the region is thus highly pronounced – currently, 
some 56 per cent of Asia countries’ trade, and 43 per cent of their foreign 
investment, is with partners in the Region.v 
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A major benefit of economic interdependence is that is has fostered the rise 
of global value chains within the Asian region. Global value chains are the 
networks of functionally-connected economic activities necessary to create a 
finished product, where these activities occur not in a single country but are 
shared across multiple countries. An indicative example is the global value chain 
for the Apple Corporation’s iPhone: while assembled (and hence nominally 
‘made’) in China, the iPhone incorporates parts from Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 
manufactured according to US industrial designs, and marketed through retail 
partnerships with telecommunications companies throughout the world. 
Global value chains are common in the Asian region, and have become well 
developed in textiles, electronics, consumer goods, food and automobile 
industries. Participation in global value chains has been instrumental in 
supporting Asian industrialisation – by opening new opportunities for 
manufacturing exports, enabling economies to build competitive strengths 
in industrial niches, and allowing an intra-regional ‘sharing’ of production 
opportunities between countries of differing developmental levels.
Intergovernmental arrangements
Regional economic interdependence has not, however, simply occurred 
naturally. Economic links between Asian countries have been fostered by 
political arrangements between governments that have established open, 
rules-based and integrated markets within the Region. Four nested multilateral 
bodies have been integral to this process. At the centre of the arrangements 
is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which in 1992 began 
the process of establishing a free trade area within Southeast Asia. In 1997, 
its economic cooperation efforts were broadened through the formation of 
the ASEAN Plus Three grouping (bringing in China, Japan and Korea), which 
established a range of cross-regional policy dialogues, particularly in the 
financial sphere. These bodies were augmented in 2005 with the formation 
of the broader East Asia Summit grouping (adding Russia, India, the US 
and Australia), which has focussed on promoting integration and collective 
responses to regional economic challenges. The work of these bodies is in turn 
supported by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, a forum of 
21 economies formed in 1989 committed to promoting free trade in the Asia-
Pacific.
Each of these bodies has played a key role in developing the inter-governmental 
arrangements necessary for economic interdependence in Asia. APEC has 
consistently promoted trade and investment liberalisation, and hosts a range 
of sectoral policy dialogues between government ministries in the region. 
The ASEAN has served as a hub for free trade agreements in the Region, 
establishing the ‘common effective preferential tariff’ scheme amongst its 
members in addition to signing trade agreements with China, India, Japan, 
Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit 
have played an important role in dealing with economic crises facing the region, 
particularly in the spheres of finance, energy security and climate change. 
Economic integration in Asia has depended upon these multilateral bodies, 
which have established principles for regional economic cooperation, built trust 
between governments and set rules for national policy regimes. Without their 
contribution, economic interdependence within the region – and by extension 
the Asian economic miracle – would not have been possible. 
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Asia has clearly been one of the major developmental success stories of the 
late 20th century. Over a five-decade period, successive Asian countries have 
experienced industrialisation, urbanisation and rapid human development, 
quickly closing the development gap between the Region and the rest of the 
world. Three features have defined the Asian miracle. First, Asian economies 
have all relied upon industrialisation to drive high-speed growth. Second, all 
have used outward-looking economic strategies to promote development, 
which has driven ever-deepening levels of mutually beneficial economic 
interdependence within the region. Third, political arrangements have 
supported this process, with a range of regional organisations working to 
achieve policy cooperation between governments. This combination – of 
industrialisation, outward-orientation and supportive regional institutions – has 
been the driving force behind Asia’s rise to become the centre of focus of the 
international system.
Contemporary Asian Development Challenges
The Asian economic miracle of the last several decades is far from over. 
The structural drivers of economic growth – progressively advancing 
industrialisation, urbanisation, and deepening regional integration – are 
ongoing trends, leading most analysts to expect the Region’s performance 
to continue for the foreseeable future. In the short-term, the International 
Monetary Fund’s forecasts that between 2013 and 2018 the ASEAN-6’s nominal 
GDP will grow by 8.9 per cent per annum, China’s by 13.1 per cent and Korea’s 
by 7.5 per cent – extremely strong performances given forecast world growth of 
only 6.3 per cent.vi Taking a longer-term view to 2030, the Asian Development 
Bank expects growth to slow somewhat, but still forecasts annual GDP growth 
of between 3.8 per cent (Thailand) and 5.7 per cent (Philippines) over the next 
two decades.vii While economic forecasting over such an extended period is 
notoriously difficult due to the impact of unexpected shocks (both positive and 
negative), the consensus view amongst economists is that high-speed growth in 
Asia will continue at least into the medium-term future.
However, while the structural drivers of growth in the Asian region look positive, 
extraneous factors may nonetheless complicate the developmental process in 
Asia in coming years. There are a range of development challenges currently 
facing the Region, which pose threats to the ability of Asian countries to sustain 
historical levels of economic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation. Many 
of these challenges are in fact a consequence of Asia’s achievements, and so 
could reasonably be considered a product of past successes. While countries 
in Asia each face their own unique set of economic imperatives, we identify 
three developmental challenges that constitute a common problem set facing 
the Region as a whole: transition in national development models; emerging 
demographic challenges; and widening socio-economic inequalities.
National development models
Many Asian countries are entering, or have already begun, a period of transition 
in national development models. Most economies in the region initially achieved 
high growth through export-oriented industrialisation focussed on labour-
intensive manufactures – such as textiles, consumer goods and electronics 
assembly. While this strategy proved markedly successful, particularly during 
the 1980s and 1990s, two constraints will limit its future sustainability. First, 
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export-oriented industrialisation critically depends on the availability of buoyant 
external markets, which have typically been found in the US and Western 
Europe. But with Asian countries catching-up technologically, and growth 
in the Western world stalling, the scope for export-led growth is becoming 
increasingly tougher. Second, Asia is facing increasing competition in labour-
intensive manufacturing, as other developing countries in South Asia and Africa 
with lower wage costs have begun to develop their own export industries. It 
is unlikely that export-oriented industrialisation will continue to be a viable 
development strategy for Asia.
Indeed, many Asian governments have realised this challenge, and have started 
efforts to shift towards new developmental models. These strategies focus on 
capital and knowledge-intensive industries (such as automobiles, IT, engineering 
and technology services), and are oriented toward growing domestic rather 
than overseas markets. China provides an archetypical case, with the Chinese 
government officially signalling a transition to a domestic-oriented and 
higher-value industrial strategy in the 10th Five Year Plan of 2001. However, 
transitioning between development models is not an easy task. It requires 
governments to experiment with new economic policies – particularly in the 
fields of technology, education and infrastructure – which will require a trial-
and-error policy learning process. It will also demand new political structures 
for regional economic cooperation – as policy focus will shift from Western 
countries to partners in the Asian region, and towards more complex trade 
issues such as services, intellectual property, investment and technical standards. 
These shifts in national and regional policy frameworks will prove challenging, 
but are essential if Asia’s economic dynamism is to continue.
Demographic challenges
The Asian region is increasingly facing demographic challenges (as noted in 
Chapter 1). On the one hand, in parts of the Region population structures are 
ageing rapidly, as longer life expectancy and lower birth rates increase the 
share of elderly people in the population. Ageing is most commonly found 
in high-income countries such as Japan, Singapore, Korea and Australia; but 
is increasingly also occurring in China, where the median age increased from 
24.8 to 34.6 years between 1990 and 2010.viii On the other hand, some parts 
of the Region are experiencing extremely rapid population growth, driven by 
improvements in nutrition, housing, perinatal health and a reduced infectious 
diseases burden. This is occurring largely in the lower-income countries of 
Southeast Asia, which have more recently entered a period of high-speed 
growth and modernisation. Current UN forecasts indicate that the population 
of Southeast Asia will grow by 19 per cent by 2030, though some very high 
growth countries (such as Malaysia and the Philippines) will see population 
growth exceed 30 per cent.ix 
These regional demographic trends pose opposing but equally challenging 
threats to Asian economies. In high-income countries, ageing is driving increases 
in dependency rates – the proportion of the population not in the labour 
force. Old age dependency rates are currently 11 per cent in China, 15 per 
cent in Korea and as high as 36 per cent in Japan. However, if fertility and 
mortality rates remain constant, these rates will rise to 65 per cent in Japan, 
57 per cent in Korea and 35 per cent in China by 2050.x Shrinking labour 
forces will undermine economic growth, and necessitate major and costly 
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revisions to national welfare and health systems. In low income countries, high 
population growth is instead putting additional pressure on economic issues 
such as urbanisation, job creation, infrastructure, environmental quality and 
food security. While Southeast Asian countries’ population are forecast to grow 
by 27 per cent by 2050, their urban populations are expected to double to 
500 million, seriously challenging the absorptive capacity of already strained 
Asian mega-cities. Large investments in infrastructure, social services and food 
production will be essential if urban population growth is to be managed 
sustainably.
Socio-economic inequalities
There has been a marked increase in levels of socio-economic asymmetry within 
the Asian region. These asymmetries take two forms. One is the inter-country 
dimension, where the region is divided between groups of high income (Japan, 
Korea and Singapore), middle income (China, India and the ASEAN-6) and low 
income CMLV economies. The second is the intra-country dimension, where 
economic inequality within nations has widened as some social groups have 
benefited from high-speed growth more than others. Both forms of socio-
economic asymmetry are presently on the rise. Strong economic performance 
in some countries (particularly China, India and Vietnam) alongside weaker 
performance in others (Philippines and Indonesia) has increased inter-country 
disparities while the Gini index (a measure of economic inequality) has grown 
in the majority of regional countries. This demonstrates that while economic 
growth in Asia as a whole is high, it has also been very uneven, leading to a 
widening of ‘development gaps’ in the region.
Table 2: Economic asymmetries within and between Asian countries
Gini index GDP pc PPP (2005 USD)
Circa 1990 2009/2010 Change Circa 1990 2010
Annual 
growth rate
Cambodia 38.3 36.0 -2.3 774 1937 4.69%
China 32.4 42.1 9.7 1101 6819 9.55%
India 31.9 33.9 2.0 1217 3122 4.82%
Indonesia 29.2 39.6 10.4 2073 3873 3.17%
Japan 24.9 37.6 12.7 26523 31030 0.79%
Korea 32.0 41.9 9.9 11383 26774 4.37%
Malaysia 46.2 46.2 0.0 6874 13767 3.53%
Philippines 40.6 43.0 2.4 2538 3554 1.70%
Singapore 42.0 47.8 5.8 25234 52314 3.71%
Thailand 45.3 40.0 -5.3 3967 7987 3.56%
Vietnam 35.7 35.6 -0.1 905 2875 5.95%
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.
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These growing socio-economic asymmetries are problematic, because they 
contribute towards social and political divides within the Region. One 
dimension is the rich-poor divide, which has become more pronounced in 
many countries as the gap between poor social groups and the rising middle 
class widens. A second is urban-rural divide, as urban residents enjoy better 
access to food, housing, education, employment and social services than those 
remaining in rural areas. A third and increasingly recognised asymmetry is 
the so-called ‘connection gap’ between those who have access to modern 
telecommunications services and those who do not. With telecommunications 
becoming increasingly essential for all aspects of social life, a lack of 
connectivity threatens to exacerbate the economic and social disadvantages of 
already marginalised groups.
Narrowing the Development Divide in ASEAN: The CLMV countries
ASEAN aims to integrate all its member economies and create an ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by 2015.xi In 2007, AEC launched a blueprint 
aimed at to achieving this ambitious goal. If realised, an integrated 
market and production base would keep the ASEAN region economically 
competitive and attractive to foreign investors, especially Multinational 
Corporations.   
However, the greatest challenge to economic integration and the AEC 
project is the wide development gap that exists among its member countries, 
especially between the more developed ASEAN countries and the CLMV 
countries—Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam.
This development divide is reflected not only in economic terms (e.g. GDP 
per capita) but also in human development and socio-economic indicators. 
The CLMV countries have experienced rapid growth rates over the past 
decade, which has helped them to economically catch-up with its more 
advanced ASEAN members. However there continues to be significant 
development gaps. There is a need to increase the speed and breath of 
policy reforms to address this issue, especially in the area of trade policy 
(on trade and transport facilitation), improving the investment climate, 
addressing labour mobility needs, and consultation mechanisms to help 
address individual development needs.xii
ASEAN and ASEAN+6 have made great strides in economic development. 
However, for economic growth to be sustainable over the longer term and 
with greater equity among its diverse member countries, economic and 
technical cooperation will be crucial.
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Widening socio-economic inequalities are a direct threat to the economic 
prospects of Asian countries. First, they reduce the ability of disadvantaged 
groups to participate fully in the economy through health, education and 
employment opportunities, directly impacting upon national economic 
performance. More broadly, however, they also threaten social cohesion and 
integration within Asian countries. As recent events in several regional countries 
have demonstrated, widening gaps between have and have-not social groups 
can also threaten the political stability of countries themselves. Addressing these 
asymmetries will be essential if the stability and social integration that has 
underpinned the Asian economic miracle is to continue in future years.
HDI Value GDP per capi-
ta 2012
Rank 
2012
Plus 6 nation
CLMV
Myanmar 0.498160 ...
Cambodia 0.543138 671.636314
Lao PDR 0.543139 707.190383
Vietnam 0.617127 931.030764
Australia 0.9382 37228.1957
China 0.699101 3348.00988
India 0.554136 1106.79746
Japan 0.91210 36938.0091
South Korea 0.90912 21562.4463
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While challenges associated with developmental transition, demographics and 
socio-economic inequalities threaten Asia’s future economic prospects, they 
are by no means insurmountable. All three challenges are to some extent the 
consequence of past economic achievements, and reflect the fact that Asian 
countries have been remarkably successful in starting the developmental 
process. But as the Asian economic miracle progresses, the nature of the 
challenges facing governments is similarly evolving. New policies and strategies 
will need to be devised, at both the national and regional levels, to ensure these 
challenges do not derail Asia’s performance in the years ahead.
Australia’s economic enmeshment in Asia
The Asian economic miracle has proven transformative for the Australian 
(and Western Australian) economy and its connections with the Region. For 
a country that has historically been considered distant from the rest of Asia, 
Australia’s economic ties with the Region are surprisingly deep. Asian countries 
presently account for 58 per cent of Australia foreign trade,xiii 63 per cent of 
its international student population,xiv 40 per cent of tourist arrivals and 29 
per cent of its migrant intake.xvi These trade and personal links have emerged 
over a 50 year period and been instrumental in supporting the Australian 
economy during the recent global downturn, when surging commodity exports 
to Asia have underpinned a strong investment boom in the mining and energy 
sectors. However, certain historical peculiarities mean that Australia’s economic 
enmeshment in Asia is best described as ‘deep but narrow’.
Australia’s economic engagement with Asia is comparatively recent in historical 
terms. Prior to WW2 the Australian economy largely looked towards the British 
Commonwealth, to which it supplied pastoral products such as wheat and wool. 
However, as the Asian economic miracle took off, Australia’s trade patterns 
gradually realigned to be a resource supplier to industrialising (but resource 
poor) economies in Northeast Asia. Australia’s first resource relationships were 
forged with Japan, which was seeking raw materials to feed its rapidly growing 
steel industry, and saw new export-oriented iron ore and metallurgical coal 
industries established in Western Australia and Queensland in the 1960s. As 
the Asian economic miracle spread across the Region, so too did Australia’s 
resource relationships – becoming the principal minerals supplier to Korea and 
Taiwan during the 1980s, and more recently with China over the last decade. 
These resource relationships have brought considerable benefits to both sides 
– providing Australia with highly competitive export sectors, while facilitating 
industrialisation in the economies of Northeast Asia.
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The central role of Western Australia
The extent to which Australia’s economic interdependency with Asia has grown 
in recent years is in large part a story about the Western Australian economy. 
The State’s economy has undergone impressive growth in the resources sector 
as a key supplier to the expanding economies in Asia, especially China. While 
it has only 11 per cent share of the Australian national population, Western 
Australia contributed 47 per cent (A$116 billion) of Australia’s merchandise 
exports in 2012-2013, higher than New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland 
combined (45 per cent). The core of the Western Australian economy is export 
oriented, and is a major link of the Australian economy with major economies 
in the Region. It has large shares in national exports to China (69 per cent), the 
Republic of Korea (47 per cent), Japan (46 per cent) and India (30 per cent).xvii 
WA provides more than 40 per cent of China’s iron ore imports, is the dominant 
supplier of gas to Japan, and by 2020 Australia is forecast to export more 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) than any country except Qatar, with the majority of 
this sourced from Western Australia. The challenge for Western Australia is how 
it can deepen and diversify its connections in the Region to draw more fully on 
the benefits of economic integration. We return to this theme in Chapter 6. 
Source: Government of Western Australia, Department of State Development, ‘Western Australian 
Economic Profile-October 2013.’
During the 1990s, Australia’s trade ties with Asia began to broaden from 
the initial focus on the mining sector. This broadening was driven by three 
trends, all of which were linked to the rising middle class in Asia. The first 
was an expansion of Australia’s agricultural trade with the Region, as food 
demand from increasingly wealthy Asian consumers became greater and more 
diversified. Asian economies increasingly imported fine wool, beef, dairy and 
horticultural products from Australia, whose agricultural exports surged to $39 
billion by 2012.xviii The second was the development of educational exports, 
as international students from China, India and Southeast Asia were drawn to 
Australia’s high quality tertiary and higher education institutions. Australia now 
hosts approximately 330,000 international students,xix enabling the education 
sector to generate $16 billion of service exports annually.xx The third was the 
expansion of the Australian tourism sector, which capitalised on Australia’s 
endowment of natural assets and proximity to Asia to attract increasing numbers 
of tourists from the region. Successive waves of Japanese, Southeast Asian and 
Chinese tourists have seen the industry grow, and now generate $33 billion of 
export revenues. 
Of course, Australia’s resource relationships have steadily continued to deepen. 
Rapid growth in the Chinese steel and heavy industrial sectors during the 
2000s saw regional demand for raw materials soar. Australia’s minerals and 
energy exports increased five-fold – from $29 billion in 2002 to $147 billion 
in 2012.xxi This supported an investment boom that has seen $200 billion 
committed to building new mining and energy projects, the bulk of which 
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are oriented towards Asian markets. These deepening economic ties with 
Asia have been a critical factor in Australia’s economic performance: driving 
unprecedented levels of mining investment (in the 1970s and 2000s), providing 
a platform for the expansion of agricultural production, and fostering the 
development of new service industries such as education and tourism.
Australia’s narrow trade profile
While Australia’s economic relations with Asia have steadily deepened over 
the last five decades, they remain markedly narrow in their scope. One issue 
concerns Australia’s heavily concentrated trade profile. Four industries – 
agriculture, mining, education and tourism – generate the lion’s share of 
Australian exports (Table 3). This reliance on a narrow range of export sectors 
poses risks, as it over-exposes the economy to external shocks in these sectors – 
such as that experienced by the education sector in the late 2000s, where the 
rapidly appreciating Australian dollar had a notable impact in the downturn in 
international student numbers. It also demonstrates that the trade performance 
of many Australian sectors is comparatively weak, particularly the finance, 
commercial services and healthcare industries. 
Table 3: Sectoral contribution to Australian value added and exports, 2012
Sector Share of gross value added Share of exports
Agriculture 2.1% 11.6%
Mining 10.6% 48.6%
Tourism NA 11.0%
Education 4.5% 5.2%
Others 82.8% 23.6%
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services Australia, May 2013 
(cat no. 5368.0) and Australian National Accounts: National Income Expenditure and Product, March 
2013 (cat no. 5206.0).
Australia’s attractiveness as a site for foreign investment has steadily grown 
in recent years, doubling from an average of $71 billion per annum during 
the period 2001-05 to $150 billion during 2006-10.xxii But despite the 
deepening of its Asian trade links, Australia’s regional investment relationships 
are less developed – with Asian economies accounting for only 11 per cent of 
accumulated FDI stocks in 2012 (Figure 3) although this share is expected to 
grow. The bulk of investment ties remain with the UK, Europe and the US, who 
jointly account for two-thirds of foreign-owned investment stocks in Australia. 
There is also a marked sectoral bias, with the mining and financial services 
accounting for the majority of Australia’s foreign investment stocks (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3: Australian foreign investment stocks by country of origin,  
December 2012
29.8%30.6%
28.5%3.7%
5.8%
0.5%
1.1%
  EU
  United States
  Japan
  China
  Korea
  ASEAN+5
  Others
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Investment Position Australia: Supplementary 
Statistics 2012 (Cat No. 5352.0).
Figure 4: Australian foreign investment stocks by sector, June 2012
27.8% 6.5%
13.3%
50.8%
1.6%
  Mining
  Manufacturing
  Financial services
  Real estate
  Others
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position 
Australia, March 2013 (Cat No. 5302.0).
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The Australian economy has undoubtedly benefited from the Asian economic 
miracle, and over the last several decades has developed economic ties with 
partners in the region. But as already discussed, ties are relatively narrow. 
These ‘deep but narrow’ ties to Asia pose a number of challenges for the 
Australian economy. The narrow export base exposes the economy to the risk 
of external shocks that could adversely affect its trade performance, particularly 
if a moderation in world resource prices occurs over the next decade. Australia 
is also poorly connected with the global value chains developing in the Asian 
region, insofar as its contribution to these manufacturing systems is primarily 
limited to the role of a supplier of raw materials.
It is clear that a significant broadening of Australia’s economic ties with Asia 
is desirable. A diversification of exports to include service exports is necessary 
to reduce exposure to external shocks. Development of service exports will 
rely on deepening investment ties with Asian economies, in order to access 
the necessary information, skills and technology to succeed in these markets. 
Broadening trade and investment relationships will also help Australia integrate 
with global value chains in the region, opening new commercial opportunities 
outside of primary industry sectors. To fully capture the benefit of economic ties 
with Asia, Australia must transition from simply being an exporter to the Region, 
to become an economic player that is fully integrated with the Region.
Recommendations
 Recommendation 2
 Government, business and policy leaders need to increase efforts to better 
inform industry and the wider community of Australia’s interests and future 
prospects within the Region. These undertakings should emphasise 
regional societal challenges, shared environments and a common public 
interest, as well as the economic opportunities. 
 Recommendation 3
 Further efforts also need to be made to raise awareness about Australia in the 
Region, how its economy is connected into other regional economies, how 
it shares common challenges, and how greater regional engagement can 
assist in addressing these challenges.
 Recommendation 4
 Government needs to further pursue strategies to diversify the Australian 
economy with a strong focus on regional opportunities. This should entail 
the necessary policy settings to encourage investment in underdeveloped 
export industries and areas of international competitiveness. 
Diversification of exports is necessary to reduce exposure to external 
shocks. Development of the services export sector is an important aspect 
to achieving this aim.
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 Recommendation 5
 The Australian economy would benefit considerably from both a geographical 
and sectoral diversification in its foreign investment profile. Foreign 
investment brings skills, technology, and capital into the Australian 
economy, but a narrow reliance upon a handful of countries and 
industries limits the scope of these benefits. Deepening investment 
ties with Asian partners, and building these in new sectors (particularly 
services and technology) will help Australia integrate with global value 
chains in the Region, opening new commercial opportunities beyond the 
primary industries sector.
 Recommendation 6
 Government and business should consider the use of forums and other 
information platforms to share success stories and cultural learning on 
interregional investment, illustrating how it can develop mutual benefit 
for Western Australia, Australia and regional partners. A key aspect in 
these efforts would be to emphasise the importance in business dealings 
of taking the time to build relationships as a prelude to commercial 
transactions.
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Country brief: 
CHINA
China is the most populous country in the world with a rapidly ageing 
population. The ethnic composition of China is overwhelmingly Han (91.5 per 
cent) with a range of other ethnic groups making up the balance. China is the 
world’s second largest economy (in nominal GDP terms) and it is the fastest 
growing major economy. China’s annual average GDP growth between 2001 
and 2010 has been calculated at 10.5 per cent. The turn to market-oriented 
economic development after 1978 has produced dramatically improved living 
standards and an expanding middle class. The Australia-China trade relationship 
is substantial with the value of two-way flow of goods and services standing at 
$125 billion in 2012. After India, China is Australia’s largest source of skilled 
migrants and its largest source of international students. Australia and Western 
Australia in particular have been a major supplier of resources to China, and 
Australia is becoming a popular destination for Chinese tourists. There are 
a number of Australian companies operating in China and it is increasingly 
looking to Australia as a destination for investment opportunities. Australian 
governments, state and federal, have ongoing agendas to develop engagement 
with China on a range of levels. 
In its meetings and consultations in Beijing and Shanghai, the Commission heard 
from a variety of voices on China’s current situation and future prospects, and 
how Australia and Western Australia may figure in these views. The following 
provides some snapshots of these views
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Challenges
•	 China	faces	a	huge	task	of	reforming	its	current	model	of	development.	
The massive growth of the Chinese economy over recent decades 
has been driven by export and investment-led development. The 
contemporary challenge is to re-orientate the economy to a model driven 
much more by domestic demand. Critical to this task is the question of 
how China’s political leaders can circumvent vested interests in existing 
arrangements and develop domestic constituencies backing reform. 
•	 Economic	growth	and	urbanisation	has	placed	the	environment,	
infrastructure, healthcare services, energy supply, food security and the 
education system under enormous stress. Development plans to push 
further west and inland to create new economic hubs are responses to 
these pressures but they nonetheless remain major problems. 
•	 The	face	of	Chinese	society	is	changing	with	an	aging	population,	the	
ongoing migration from rural to urban settings, and greater labour 
mobility. These are altering family and community structures with 
implications for traditional social patterns. The rising middle classes and 
growing income divides are also having impacts on these patterns. In this 
regard, new social media is giving expression to a diversity of new social 
attitudes. Maintaining social stability as Chinese society develops is thus 
an ongoing challenge. 
Direct flights to Beijing
• From Sydney: 5 per week
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•	 China’s	growing	importance	as	a	major	regional	and	global	power	
is having a significant impact on security relationships in the Region, 
and East Asia in particular. A number of countries in the Region have 
longstanding strategic ties with the US but are also developing substantial 
economic relationships with China. This means that regional security is 
now being seen increasingly in terms of the challenge of ‘balancing’ the 
relations between China and the US.
On Australia and Western Australia
•	 There	are	great	opportunities	for	new	partnerships	and	collaborations	
between Australia and China. For instance, the Chinese push west and 
inland involves settling semi-arid regions. This requires knowledge and 
expertise of such settings in agricultural production, water management 
and environmental sustainability that Western Australia can provide. 
•	 There	is	poor	recognition	of	Western	Australia	in	China	outside	the	
resources sector. Western Australia should consider the longer-term goals 
of its relationship with China, and continue to diversify its relationship-
building focus and activities to include other sectors and other forms of 
engagement. 
•	 Australians	need	to	better	understand	how	business	is	done	in	China.	
There is a sense Australians do not fully appreciate the importance 
of building ‘thick’ connections in commercial matters. In China, as 
elsewhere in the Region, Australian businesses need to take the time to 
establish broader relationships with regional partners, and not act in a 
purely transactional manner. 
•	 The	value	of	Australian	education	is	generally	well	perceived,	but	there	
are issues. Australia remains an important destination for Chinese students 
but it must be ever alert to the evolving needs of Chinese industry and 
skill demands. 
Emerging leaders perspectives
•	 Chinese	people	tend	to	think	of	Australia	in	terms	of	mining	and	
resources. Australia is not seen as Asian. While Australia is multicultural, 
it also has a Western heritage. Australia is considered to be a safe country 
and this is attractive to Chinese people. More could be done to promote 
Australia and provide a broader picture of what it is about.
•	 The	battle	between	stability	and	growth	is	a	major	concern.	There	is	
the suggestion that it would be in China’s longer-term interests to slow 
growth in order to address a range of issues including the growing 
gap between rich and poor. It would allow the western provinces to 
catch up developmentally with their eastern counterparts, and it would 
provide some latitude to begin to address the significant environmental 
consequences of rapid growth and urbanisation. 
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•	 Contemporary	China	faces	many	challenges.	Food	safety,	food	security,	
and the environment are critical issues. Housing costs are rising and there 
is a lack of superannuation and other benefits. Medical care is also a 
concern, particularly for older people and the aging population in China. 
Australia and Western Australia have expertise and extensive experience 
in these areas and they could have a contribution to make in how China 
approaches these issues.
•	 Quality	is	a	challenge	for	China’s	image.	It	needs	to	remedy	the	
perception that Chinese products are of low quality. Where quality is 
an issue, Chinese companies need to be given incentives to improve 
their quality so that they can better engage with the Region and more 
globally. This applies to health and safety standards as well.
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Chapter 3
Australia and  
Regional Trade Integration 
International trade has been a key driver in the Asian economic miracle. As 
governments moved from import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation 
strategies, ‘Factory Asia’ was born. The spectacular growth of Asia’s emerging 
economies is overwhelmingly a good news story for the Region, Australia, 
and Western Australia. While the US and EU have experienced challenging 
economic conditions since the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the Australian 
economy has largely flourished, primarily due to growing East Asian demand for 
Australian exports of raw materials and food. In addition to natural resources, 
Australia also has high levels of education and tourism exports to the Region. 
While these success stories should not be underplayed, Australia’s economic 
ties with East Asia are relatively narrow, with other trade in services exports 
and investment relationships remaining under-developed at present. Although 
Australia will continue to be valued in the Region as a secure and reliable source 
of energy, food and other raw materials, it should not miss out on opportunities 
to expand its services exports. Trade in services is one of the fastest growing 
areas in global trade, especially where trade in goods becomes enmeshed with 
investment flows in complex value chains. Indeed, service industry activity in 
national economies, alongside international trade in services, is directly linked to 
the dynamism of robust 21st century economies. 
As argued in Chapter 2, Australia needs to diversify and broaden its economic 
ties with the Region, especially with regard to services exports and investment 
in industries where Australia has globally-recognised strengths. These include 
financial and business services; infrastructure and engineering services; and 
health and medical services. However, it has been difficult for Australia to 
advance its interests in securing greater opportunities for its services exports 
to economies in the Region. Indeed, in its various free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with partners in the Region, Australia has made few gains in securing improved 
opportunities for its services exporters. This has been for three principle reasons:
•	 Unlike	liberalisation	of	trade	in	goods,	which	can	be	implemented	
through reductions to tariff and other border barriers to trade, the 
liberalisation of services trade involves significant changes to domestic 
regulatory structures, including to investment regimes. 
•	 Services	liberalisation	is	often	difficult	to	undertake	on	a	bilateral	basis;	
thus services trade liberalisation often means opening an entire services 
sector to all international competition (not just Australian providers). 
•	 As	a	relatively	small	and	highly	open	economy,	Australia	lacks	both	the	
‘economic clout’ and the ‘negotiating coin’ to secure better access for its 
service exports to major Asian economies. 
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However, trade arrangements in the East Asia region – and the global economy 
more generally – have entered into a period of considerable flux. After more 
than a decade of paralysis in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Doha Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations, governments in the East Asia region have 
turned towards bilateral and regional trade negotiations in order to advance 
their national and shared interests in securing greater openness in trade and 
investment. 
This chapter surveys these developments and concludes with some 
recommendations in relation to Australia’s role in advancing these agreements 
in the interests of regional economic cooperation and development. Although 
this chapter focuses on national government – as trade agreements are made 
between sovereign states – open regionalism, greater regional economic 
integration, and the liberalisation of trade and investment flows are of direct 
salience and benefit to the Western Australian economy.
Evolving arrangements for Trade and Economic cooperation
APEC and Open Regionalism
Economic interdependence in East Asia has been largely driven by governments 
undertaking unilateral or concerted actions to facilitate the development of 
regional production networks and global supply chains. ‘Factory Asia’ did not 
emerge from formal and comprehensive trade agreements of the sort that have 
characterised North American or European integration (i.e. the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and the European Union). Rather, regional integration 
in Asia has been driven by a combination of unilateral measures, such as the 
creation of free trade export processing zones and unilateral tariff reductions. 
This regional preference for unilateral and coordinated liberalisation, rather 
than negotiated liberalisation involving the exchange of concessions, has 
reflected particular political, economic and societal characteristics of the Region. 
These include: i) the wide diversity of social, economic and political systems 
from relatively liberal and market-oriented economies through to authoritarian 
regimes; ii) the differing levels of development in the Region; iii) the Asian 
preference for consensus-based decision-making and non-formal consultation 
processes; and iv) the Region’s traditional preference for non-discriminatory 
trade arrangements. As a result, the arrangements for trade governance in 
Asia have been more open and less discriminatory than is the case in North 
America and Europe. This has been characterised by APEC members as ‘open 
regionalism’, whereby trade liberalisation undertaken by APEC governments is 
extended to all other countries – members and non-members alike.xxiii
Asian regional initiatives have also focused on strengthening the gains from 
interdependence, both regionally and globally, especially through the promotion 
of the free flow of goods, services, investment and technology transfer. A recent 
example is the Supply Chain Connectivity Initiative (SCCI), launched under the 
auspices of APEC in 2012. The SCCI has identified ‘choke points’ that prevent 
businesses in the Region from operating quickly, efficiently and reliably.xxiv These 
include:
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1. Lack of transparency on the full scope of regulatory issues affecting 
logistics; lack of awareness and coordination among government 
agencies on policies affecting logistics sector; and the absence of single 
contact point or champion agency on logistics matters within national 
bureaucracies.
2. Inefficient or inadequate transport infrastructure; lack of cross border 
physical linkages (e.g. roads, bridges).
3. Lack of capacity of local and regional logistics sub-providers.
4. Inefficient clearance of goods at the border; lack of coordination among 
border agencies, especially relating to the clearance of regulated goods.
5. Burdensome procedures for customs documentation and other 
procedures (including under preferential trade agreements).
6. Under-developed multi-modal transport capabilities (i.e. goods shipped 
under a single contract but with at least two different forms of transport); 
inefficient air, land and multi-modal connectivity.
7. Variations in cross-border standards and regulations for movement of 
goods, services and business travelers.
8. Lack of regional cross-border customs-transit arrangements. 
An interim assessment of the SCCI has identified progress in terms of 
implementing projects to improve supply chain performance, though serious 
challenges remain.xxv More generally, the initiative fits with APEC’s wider 
strategic aims of trade and investment liberalisation, business facilitation and 
economic and technical cooperation. Its promotion of regional connectivity 
also dovetails with APEC’s long-term goal of achieving free and open trade and 
investment by 2020. 
As one of APEC’s co-founders, alongside Japan, Australia has been a strong 
supporter of APEC and its commitment to ‘open regionalism’. Although it is 
not a forum for trade negotiations, APEC has played a useful role in reinforcing 
the importance of outward-looking economic policies, in supporting trade and 
investment facilitation, and in bringing the Heads of Government of the APEC 
countries together on an annual basis. APEC has also been a useful counterpoint 
in the past when more exclusive forms of East Asian regionalism threatened 
to exclude Australia. Finally, APEC has been seen as an important vehicle for 
keeping the US constructively involved in the Region, and helping to prevent a 
‘split’ down the middle of the Pacific Ocean. 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in the Region
Notwithstanding East Asia’s traditional antipathy to FTAs there has been a 
recent explosion of FTAs in the Region.4 Prior to the East Asian financial crises of 
1997-98, there was only one FTA of any note in the Region – the ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (AFTA). Since then, every country in the Region has jumped 
  4 These are typically called FTAs because they liberalise trade between the parties to the agreement; however, 
they are often described as preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to draw attention to their discriminatory nature 
against those who are not party to the agreement.
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on the bandwagon and there are now more than 100 FTAs either completed, in 
negotiation, or under study involving at least one country in the Region.xxvi 
Through this activity, three broad types of FTAs have emerged in the Region. 
The first type are those involving the US, Australia and New Zealand – which 
are deeply liberalising, comprehensive in their scope and coverage, address 
behind-the-border measures that affect trade, and include provisions that are 
not contained in WTO agreements, such as environmental and labour standards 
(‘WTO-Plus’). The second includes those negotiated by Japan and South Korea, 
which are also WTO-Plus and include development assistance for developing 
countries. A third type includes the initiatives involving ASEAN and China, 
which tend to be more weakly liberalising and more selective in their scope and 
coverage.
There has been a great deal of debate about the economic impact of these FTAs, 
ranging from optimistic estimations about their positive welfare effects through 
to pessimistic claims about the costs that will be imposed on the efficient 
management of regional and global supply chains due to their discriminatory 
provisions – the so-called ‘noodle bowl’ effect. On the available evidence to 
date, the aggregate effect of these FTAs appears to have been less than either 
their supporters or detractors would expect. Most of them are relatively shallow 
in their coverage and, on the whole, they have neither delivered great benefits 
nor caused significant levels of trade diversion.xxvii
That is not to say that these FTAs are without value. In some cases, governments 
have pursued FTAs for defensive reasons, to offset the damage done to their 
exporters by FTAs signed by their important trade partners. A good example 
of this is Australia’s pursuit of an FTA with South Korea, due to the adverse 
impact of the Korea-US FTA on Australia’s beef exports to South Korea (which 
is estimated to cost the Australian beef industry $1.4 billion over the next 15 
years). There are similar drivers for Australia’s FTA with China, which aims in 
part to ensure that Australian agricultural exports secure the same preferential 
access achieved by New Zealand in its FTA with China. In addition, many of 
the FTAs in the Region have been strongly influenced by political, diplomatic 
or security considerations, in which case their value is not denominated in 
economic gains per se, but rather in their ability to promote other foreign policy 
considerations.xxviii
Australia’s Bilateral FTAs
Concomitant with global and regional trends towards FTAs, since 2000 Australia 
has launched negotiations for bilateral FTAs with a dozen countries, all but one 
of which are with regional partners. Only five of these 12 agreements have been 
concluded, and with the exception of the Australia-US FTA, these have been 
with relatively small trading partners (e.g. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia). By 
contrast, as Table 4 below illustrates, Australia’s bilateral FTA negotiations with 
its most important trade partners in the Region – China, Japan and Korea – have 
been running for several years without significant progress. 
Together, China, Japan and Korea accounted for 57 per cent of Australia’s 
merchandise exports in 2012 and completing FTAs with these countries could 
yield major benefits for Australia, especially in relation to agriculture, services 
and investment. However, success has eluded negotiators to date.xxix
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Negotiations with China – Australia’s most important two-way trade partner – 
have been running for more than eight years, with no end in sight. The sticking 
points are numerous, and they include Chinese sensitivities about agriculture 
and services imports and Australia’s reluctance to raise threshold levels for 
Chinese investments assessed by the Foreign Investment Review Board.
Table 4: Australia’s Free Trade Agreements, September 2013
Country Proposed Negotiation 
starts
Agreement 
reached
Negotiating 
rounds
Current status
Singapore Nov 2000 Apr 2001 Feb 2003 10 Complete
Thailand Jul 2001 Aug 2002 Jul 2004 8 Complete
US Nov 2002 Mar 2003 May 2004 7 Complete
China Oct 2003 May 2005 19 Negotiation
Malaysia Jul 2004 May 2005 May 2012 12 Complete
Japan Apr 2005 Apr 2007 16 Negotiation
GCC Jun 2006 Jul 2007 4 Suspended 
2009
Chile Dec 2006 Aug 2007 July 2008 4 Complete
Indonesia Aug 2007 Mar 2013 2 Negotiation
India Apr 2008 Jul 2011 5 Negotiation
Korea Apr 2008 May 2009 5 Negotiation
Source: Compiled by Jeffrey Wilson from http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/ 
FTA negotiations with Japan, which commenced in 2007, have also dragged 
on beyond expectations. Japan is heavily reliant on imports of key Australian 
mineral and energy resources and it has been interested in using the FTA as 
a means to ensure a stable and secure supply. For its part, Australia has been 
keen to negotiate reductions in the rates of Japanese agricultural protection, 
which are among the highest in the world. However, political pressure from its 
domestic farm lobbies has greatly constrained the Japanese government’s ability 
to manoeuvre.
Negotiations with South Korea have also been difficult. Australian agricultural 
exporters are keen to restore ground that was lost to the EU and the US as a 
result of their FTAs with Korea. In addition, Australian services exporters could 
stand to gain significantly in an agreement with South Korea. However, the 
Australian government does not wish to concede to Korea’s request for investor-
state dispute settlement provisions, and this has proved to be a major stumbling 
block to finalising this FTA. 
The new Australian federal government has committed itself to completing all 
three agreements during its first term, but this would likely entail prioritising a 
few key sectors (e.g. beef, lamb, dairy) at the expense of comprehensive FTAs 
that include the liberalisation of services and investment. Such deals may help to 
‘level the playing field’ again in terms of the damage caused to some Australian 
agricultural exporters in the context of other Regional FTAs. But they are not 
likely to yield great gains for Australia’s commercial and investment interests 
and partnerships in the Region, nor help to diversify Australia’s export mix. 
Indeed, interest in the Region seems to be moving away from bilateral FTAs to 
broader regional agreements involving many members.
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Regional Trade Agreements
Three major integration frameworks have emerged in the Region since 2010: 
1. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which has become a hub for the 
promotion of free trade agreements in the Region, through its ‘ASEAN 
Plus One’ agreements with China, India, Japan, Korea, and Australia and 
New Zealand;
2. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which 
involves the members of ASEAN Plus Six (but not the US); and, 
3. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which involves twelve APEC members 
(but not China).
Figure 5: Economic Institutions in Asia and the Pacific (Apr.13)
 
Source: Compiled by Takashi Terada
In terms of their potential to re-shape trading arrangements in the Region, the 
two most interesting of these proposals are the ASEAN/China-centred RCEP 
and the US-centred TPP. Both are ‘mega-FTAs’ that include a broad group 
of developed and developing countries, including the many fast growing 
economies in the Asian region. While both the RCEP and the TPP are open to 
future members and therefore serve as potential stepping stones to APEC’s long 
term aspiration to achieve a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), each 
agreement differs in its scope, coverage, aspirations and membership. 
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The TPP is a regional free trade agreement that is currently being negotiated 
among 12 APEC members (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam). It is 
distinctive and potentially path breaking in several key respects: 
•	 First,	it	is	a	‘trans-regional’	agreement	that	aims	to	link	countries	at	
different stages of development in four different regions in the Asia 
Pacific (East Asia, Oceania, North America, and South America). 
•	 Second,	it	aims	to	be	a	high	quality	‘WTO-Plus’	agreement	that	will	
go beyond conventional tariff-cutting negotiations to address domestic 
regulatory policies that have an impact on trade and investment. The 
negotiating agenda includes rules for investment, the harmonisation 
of regulatory standards, and trade-related rules in areas such as labour 
standards, environmental protection and state-owned enterprises. 
•	 Third,	it	is	meant	to	begin	to	untangle	the	‘noodle	bowl’	of	criss-crossing	
and conflicting FTAs among APEC members and serve as a stepping- 
stone to a much larger free trade zone in the Asia-Pacific. 
•	 Finally,	it	has	the	unusual	feature	of	being	open	to	other	APEC	members	
to join; indeed, Japan, Mexico and Canada joined several years after the 
TPP negotiations commenced.xxx
With its membership of ASEAN Plus Six – including China, India, and Japan – 
the RCEP is potentially the basis for the largest regional trade agreement in the 
world. Like the TPP, it is open to others to join in the future but the similarities 
with the TPP end there. Reflecting the preferences of its major proponent, 
China, the RCEP is in the ASEAN/China ‘family’ of FTAs that are weakly 
liberalising, selective in scope and coverage, and which do not seek to extend 
rule-making beyond what is currently contained in WTO agreements. The RCEP 
is far more oriented towards the trade policy preferences of developing countries 
and least developed countries in the Region, and will likely contain exemptions 
in the form of tariff elimination duties. The speed and level of liberalisation will 
be based on the standard that ASEAN countries generally prefer. Moreover, it 
will likely have few deregulation requirements that would demand the reform of 
domestic economic systems. 
The dissimilarities in these integration models make any future merger of TPP 
and RCEP unlikely. This also means the US and China will continue to compete 
against each other over trade and investment rule-making in the Region. 
Nonetheless, as a member of both the TPP and the RCEP, Australia has an 
opportunity to make a significant contribution to both negotiations.
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TPP, RCEP and Australia
In strictly economic terms, neither the TPP nor the RCEP offers many direct 
benefits to Australia. The RCEP is unlikely to produce significant liberalisation 
of services and investment sectors, in part because China strongly resists this 
type of liberalisation, which requires greater transparency in the business 
activities in its state-owned companies. In addition, ASEAN as a whole does 
not have a strong appetite for WTO-Plus type liberalisation, given that the 10 
ASEAN nations are highly diverse in terms of their stage of development, their 
openness, and their domestic sensitivities. ASEAN’s 2009 ‘plus one’ agreement 
with Australia and New Zealand (AANZFTA) reflects these preferences. The 
agreement offers little by way of improved access to Australian services 
exporters; it provisions on government procurement, which would normally 
be expected in a high quality agreement, are not well developed; and its 
investment access commitments have yet to be scheduled. The RCEP agreement 
is not likely to advance beyond the template established in this agreement.
Although the TPP has a much higher level of ambition than the RCEP, the offers 
currently on the table do not provide significantly improved access for Australian 
exporters in highly protected agriculture sectors (e.g. sugar in the US, beef 
in Japan). There is also little prospect of commercially meaningful access for 
Australian services providers in key TPP markets. Moreover, TPP participants 
differ considerably in their negotiating priorities, and the demands of the US 
will reach deep into regulatory systems, in some cases exceeding WTO rules 
(e.g. intellectual property, financial services, investment), and in other cases 
introducing rules that are not in the WTO at all (e.g. labour and environmental 
standards). These provisions pose heavy demands on the developing country 
members of the TPP and they may yet prove to be a stumbling block to 
reaching an agreement.xxxi
Nonetheless, Australia is fortunate in being one of the few countries at the 
table in both the TPP and the RCEP negotiations (the others are Brunei, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam). This presents Australia with an 
important opportunity to influence both of these mega-FTAs in a way that 
advances the interests of the countries in the Region. Such a prospect is not 
fanciful: Australia has a long history of ‘punching above its weight’ in trade 
negotiations to provide intellectual leadership and innovative ideas to produce 
mutually beneficial outcomes. Significantly, Australia has done this by building 
and leading coalitions of developed and developing countries to advance their 
shared interests, rather than adopting the world-view of a ‘like-minded’ major 
power, such as the US. Well known examples of Australia’s middle power 
leadership in trade negotiations include the Cairns Group of Agricultural Fair 
Trading nations, which had a significant impact on the WTO Uruguay Round 
outcomes, as well as Australia’s role in the negotiations of the WTO General 
Agreement on Trade in Services.xxxii
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Australia’s way forward
So, what might be the best way forward for Australia? 
First, Australia needs to push very hard to ensure that it achieves improved 
access for its agriculture and services exports among the developed country 
partners to the TPP. Second, it needs to encourage and promote the RCEP as 
one element of a more comprehensive program of regional development and 
economic integration. Advancing the RCEP is in Australia’s national interest 
– unlike the TPP, the RCEP includes all of the Region’s major economies. But 
advancing RCEP as part of a broader strategy for regional integration also serves 
the interests of development and growth across the Region as a whole. The RCEP 
could be negotiated so as to allow different time frames for implementation of 
new rules and commitments, to give developing and least developed country 
members appropriate adjustment periods. Moreover, drawing on the Japanese 
and Korean approaches to FTAs in the region, as well as the AANZFTA, the RCEP 
should include provisions for economic cooperation. These can be designed 
to build confidence and capacity in ASEAN countries, helping governments 
to identify trade and investment policies that are appropriate to their 
circumstances, while also being supportive of the goals of transparency and 
non-discrimination.
The creation of RCEP should go hand in hand with other initiatives of ASEAN, 
the East Asia Summit, and APEC to promote regional economic integration.  
For instance, ASEAN is undertaking a number of initiatives to strengthen 
physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages, as well as obtaining 
access to infrastructure financing, which are key to the development of a single 
market.xxxiii Similarly, APEC’s continued focus on strengthening the ‘soft’ aspects 
of connectivity such as supply chain connectivity and structural reforms will 
help to improve regional connectivity. Such initiatives are complementary to  
the RCEP and consistent with APEC’s commitment to advance a wide range of 
‘next generation’ trade and investment issues that would help to realise the 
FTAAP.xxxiv Finally, the US should be invited to join the RCEP, so as to mitigate 
concerns that the TPP and the RCEP represent competing and potentially 
divisive visions of Regional economic cooperation.
Addressing Australia’s stalled bilateral FTA negotiations will prove a more 
vexing policy challenge. Concluding FTAs with important trade partners such 
as Japan, Korea and China could offer significant benefits for the Australian 
economy, particularly in areas such as agricultural market access that have 
hitherto been left behind in both WTO and regional FTA disciplines. But these 
talks have proved arduous due to national sensitivities around agriculture and 
service exports, and are unlikely to be concluded without Australia significantly 
moderating its requests. This might be achieved by prioritising the interests of a 
smaller range of export sectors, in order to ‘sign the deal that is available now’. 
However, it is questionable whether making such trade-offs to complete bilateral 
FTAs is appropriate, given that it would necessitate picking and choosing 
between the interests of Australia’s main export industries. In such a context, a 
more equitable and prudent approach would be to focus effort on regional-level 
trade arrangements (such as the TPP and RCEP), which can benefit all Australian 
export industries and genuinely liberalise trade and investment on a regional, 
rather than bilateral, basis.
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Recommendations
 Recommendation 7
 Australia is one of the few countries that is a member of both the TPP 
and the RCEP. Both agreements present Australia with an important 
opportunity to influence the evolving trade arrangements in the Region, 
in a way that advances the interests of all participants. The TPP, which 
involves major developed countries including Japan and the US, has 
a high level of ambition for the liberalisation of trade in services and 
agriculture. Australia needs to push very hard for a high quality outcome in 
the TPP on market access issues in order to improve export prospects for 
Australian agriculture and services industries. 
 Recommendation 8
 RCEP has a lower level of ambition than the TPP, but it includes all of 
the Region’s major economies. Advancing RCEP as part of a broader 
strategy for economic integration will serve the interests of all economies 
in the Region, including its least developed nations. Australia has a 
record of leadership in trade negotiations to advance the shared interests 
of developed and developing countries alike. It should draw on these 
capacities and traditions to advance the RCEP in a way that serves the interests 
of all involved. Creative proposals could include different time frames 
for implementation, reflecting the different levels of development of its 
members. 
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Country brief: 
SOUTH KOREA
South Korea is Asia’s fourth largest economy with a population of 50 million 
that is rapidly ageing. It is deeply traditional with a strong Buddhist heritage 
but also has one of the largest Christian populations in Asia. While Koreans 
are very proud of their heritage and language, they are also preoccupied with 
learning English, and more recently, Chinese. Over the last four decades South 
Korea has undergone substantial growth and global integration, becoming a 
high-tech industrialized economy. The export focus of the economy meant that 
it was hit hard by the 2008 global downturn but it has subsequently rebounded 
to register positive growth. After several decades of authoritarian rule, South 
Korea transitioned to democracy in 1987 and is now one of Asia’s most vibrant 
democracies. In early 2013 President Park Geun-hye became South Korea’s first 
female leader. The threat of war on the Korean peninsula has been a constant 
for more than 50 years, at times raised to serious levels. Australia and South 
Korea have well-established trade relations with great potential for further 
development. South Korea is a major market for Australia’s raw materials and 
supplies a range of manufactured products into the Australian market such 
as cars, smartphones and electrical appliances. There are potential bilateral 
trade opportunities in areas such as two-way investment flows, agriculture, and 
partnerships on technical and services expertise. Australia and South Korea 
both have a strong security alliance with the US, and share a common concern 
for stability in the Asian region. They increasingly cooperate in international 
forums on global issues such as nuclear disarmament and climate change. 
People-to-people links go back to Australia’s involvement in the Korean War 
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and this remains a positive element in Korea’s collective memory. There are 
now nearly 90,000 people of Korean ancestry living in Australia as well as 
significant numbers of Korean students studying in Australia. But this tends to 
be a one-way flow, pressing the need to further develop Australia-South Korea 
engagement. 
In its Seoul consultations, the Commission heard from a range of voices on 
South Korea’s current situation and future prospects, and how Australia and 
Western Australia may figure in these considerations. The following provides 
some snapshots of these views
Challenges
•	 The	security	situation	with	North	Korea	and	the	issue	of	reunification	are	
ongoing and permeate Korean life and public discourse. How and when 
it will be resolved remains a central conundrum. 
•	 The	emergence	of	China	as	an	economic	powerhouse	provides	South	
Korea with new opportunities but also difficulties. In particular, how can 
it develop economic relations with China while continuing to maintain its 
deep relationship with the US.
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•	 The	maturing	of	the	South	Korean	economy	has	raised	questions	about	
how to evolve its developmental model, especially after its experience of 
the 2008 global downturn. A key challenge in this regard is finding a 
balance in the Korean economy between the heavy reliance on exports 
and developing domestic-oriented sectors.
•	 As	in	many	advanced	economies,	South	Korea	faces	the	problems	
associated with a rapidly aging population. One way to deal with this 
problem is to develop immigration programs to bolster growth. Given its 
homogeneity, this presents the question if and how South Korea would 
deal with substantial immigration.
On Australia and Western Australia
•	 The	Australian	Korean	War	connection	remains	strong	in	Korean’s	minds.	
However, the general population knows little about, and rarely visits, 
Australia or Western Australia. The Australian government needs to do 
more to raise awareness of Australia in South Korea. At present there is 
good but narrow knowledge about each other.
•	 There	is	a	sense	in	South	Korea	that	Australia	is	preoccupied	with	India	
and China as economic giants. This detracts from efforts to further 
develop the Australia-South Korea relationship even though the trade 
figures are extremely strong. 
•	 As	middle	powers,	South	Korea	and	Australia	could	do	a	lot	more	to	
collaborate on aid programs and capacity building in the Region. 
Also they could explore ways to work together on brokering dialogues 
between the US and China.
•	 Australian	businesses	operating	in	South	Korea	tend	to	find	regulation	
settings overly burdensome and difficult. By contrast, South Korean 
businesses are attracted to the policy stability they experience in 
Australia. Moreover, Australia presents good opportunities for Korean 
offshore investment and more can be made of this. There is great 
anticipation about concluding the Australia-South Korea free trade 
agreement, especially on the part of Australian agricultural exporters. 
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Emerging leaders perspectives
•	 The	emerging	leaders	expressed	concerns	about	the	ongoing	North	Korea	
threat and the view that reunification will eventually take place. However, 
while the issue is always present, people tend to get on with the rest of 
life. 
•	 There	were	also	concerns	about	what	the	implications	are	for	Korea	
with the emergence of China’s power. South Korea needs to develop its 
economic relations with China but this is complicated by the strong and 
longstanding relationship with the US. 
•	 Australia	is	generally	not	considered	a	part	of	Asia	because	of	its	western	
cultural heritage and ethnic profile. However globalization and economic 
engagement is beginning to draw it more into the Region. Several young 
leaders argued that specific interaction is the more important point and 
that this generally focuses on finding common interests rather than 
resting on some notion of being ‘Asian’ or not.
•	 Koreans	have	a	very	strong	preoccupation	with	the	US	and	its	culture,	and	
young people aspire to study in the US. By contrast, Australia does not 
readily come to mind and there is little knowledge about Australia. There 
was only limited awareness of the South Korean community in Australia 
and in Sydney in particular. Nonetheless, they expressed a strong desire 
to know more about Australia. 
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Chapter 4
Resources: 
Interdependence  
and Security
The early 21st century is witnessing rapid change in the global patterns 
of production and consumption of natural resources. Industrialisation and 
urbanisation in a wide range of developing countries has caused world demand 
for energy, minerals and food to soar. Rising prices and concerns about scarcity 
are posing resource security challenges for governments around the world. This 
is particularly true in the Asia-Pacific, where regional interdependence between 
resource-poor consumers in East Asia and resource-rich producers on the Pacific 
Rim has come under stress during the recent global resource boom. 
As secure resource systems are essential for economic growth and transformation 
in the Region, it is imperative that Asia’s resource security is effectively 
addressed. How can regional resource systems in the Asia-Pacific be made 
more secure, interdependent, and resilient in the face of intensifying resource 
challenges? In this chapter, we survey the state of resource security in the 
Asia-Pacific, examine the nature of contemporary resource challenges at the 
national and international level, and explore the role Western Australia can 
play in fostering interdependent and secure resource relationships between the 
economies of the Region.
Resource Interdependence and Security in the Asia-Pacific
As outlined in Chapter 2, resource interdependence is a major driver of 
economic integration between the Asian economies. On one hand, the Region 
is home to major global centres of resource consumption – the industrialised 
economies of Japan, Korea and China – which lack sufficient reserves of natural 
resources to meet their domestic needs. However, the Region is also home to 
many of the world’s major resource producers – such as Australia, India, New 
Zealand, Thailand and Indonesia – which possess large and globally competitive 
export industries across a wide range of primary industries. 
This regional mix of producers and consumers is fortuitous, because it 
means Asia is highly interdependent yet reasonably self-sufficient in natural 
resources. In terms of international trade, there is a vigorous seaborne trade 
in food, energy and minerals from exporting countries on the Pacific Rim to 
consumption centres in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Flowing in the opposite 
direction, foreign investment from Northeast Asian industrial conglomerates 
into mining and agricultural projects helps to finance and develop resource 
industries around the Pacific region. As a result, resource interdependence is 
very deep, with just under half of countries’ trade in resource commodities 
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being with other partners in the Region (Table 5). These trade and investment 
ties are mutually beneficial for all parties, providing producers with major 
export industries while helping to solve the resource security dilemmas of 
import-dependent consumers. 
As the Region’s largest net resource exporter, Australia is a lynchpin of resource 
interdependence in the Asia-Pacific. The Australian economy has historically 
relied upon primary industries – built upon wool and wheat exports in the 
early 20th century, before establishing major iron ore, coal and beef sectors 
from the late 1960s. Australia’s resource production has grown strongly since 
this time, and it now exports $98 billion of minerals, $74 billion of energy and 
$19 billion of agricultural products annually.xxxv Much of Australia’s resource 
production is financed by foreign investment, with the country attracting $194 
billion of inward investment into its mining sector alone between 2006-07 and 
2011-12.xxxvi The majority of resource output is exported to markets in Asia, 
and in 2010 Australia supplied 8 per cent of the Region’s agricultural and 29 
per cent of its mineral imports.xxxvii Within Australia, the importance of Asian-
oriented resource sectors is most pronounced in Western Australia. The state 
currently accounts for 58 per cent of Australian mining and 10 per cent of 
agricultural production,xxxviii and the two sectors accounted for 37 per cent of 
Western Australian gross state product in 2011-12.xxxix
Table 5: Resource interdependence in ASEAN+6 countries, 2010 (USD millions)
Agriculture Minerals and energy
Imports Exports Trade 
balance
% trade w/ 
region
Imports Exports Trade 
balance
% trade w/ 
region
Australia 7812 19237 11425 55% 26711 120485 93774 75%
Cambodia 167 55 -112 65% 375 7 -368 98%
China 48111 41855 -6256 30% 325688 30115 -295573 34%
India 5483 16405 10922 29% 122118 47606 -74512 21%
Indonesia 10755 8307 -2448 52% 29541 56677 27136 79%
Japan 56117 3966 -52151 41% 236773 18482 -218291 37%
Korea 17122 3922 -13200 48% 145004 33851 -111153 37%
Malaysia 9808 5676 -4132 61% 18801 32165 13364 78%
Myanmar 172 1490 1318 80% 952 2952 2000 99%
New Zealand 2669 15308 12639 49% 5058 1761 -3297 67%
Philippines 6063 2162 -3901 55% 11461 2033 -9428 52%
Singapore 6852 4012 -2840 70% 82224 57750 -24474 56%
Thailand 7977 23952 15975 44% 33044 10651 -22393 45%
Vietnam 6295 13500 7205 43% 9513 8274 -1239 83%
Total 185405 159847 -25558 43% 1047263 422809 -624454 45%
Source: UN Comtrade Database
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The global resources boom
Despite patterns of mutually beneficial interdependence, resource issues have 
become a vexing policy issue for many regional governments due to the recent 
global resource boom. Driven by rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in a 
range of developing economies, world demand for minerals, food and energy 
has grown rapidly. However, owing to the economics of natural resource 
industries, where investment has long lead times in the order of five to 10 
years, global supply has failed to keep pace with demand. World prices began 
a period of unprecedentedly rapid growth around 2005, and by 2012 most 
natural resource prices had grown between two-and-a-half and five times on 
their levels only a decade earlier (Figure 6). International investment in resource 
industries has surged as resource firms move to feed the increased demand 
at record-level prices, with global cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the 
mining and energy sector doubling from an annual average of USD 20 billion 
during the period 2000-04 to 41 billion in 2005-09.xl
Figure 6: Global resource price indices, 2000-2012
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The global resource boom has threatened the resource security of many 
governments – a situation where an economy enjoys the continuous availability of 
needed natural resources at reasonable prices. With a few exceptions (Australia, 
New Zealand and Malaysia), all of the countries in the region are net resource 
importers, whose economies rely on overseas sources for their food, energy and 
mineral needs. Surging demand and rising prices have reduced the affordability 
of resource imports, set off inflationary pressures, and led to rising trade deficits. 
For example, the ASEAN’s minerals and energy import bill increased six-fold 
between 2001 and 2011, and now accounts for 26 per cent of grouping’s 
combined imports.xli As a result, the global resource boom has instead been 
labelled as a ‘resource crisis’ in many Asian countries. This crisis has two distinct 
but interrelated strands.
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Mineral and energy security
One part of the Asian resource crisis concerns mineral and energy security. With 
only a few exceptions, most countries in Asia have few to no reserves of mineral 
resources, leaving them highly exposed to movements in world prices. Mineral 
and energy security is particularly pressing for the Region’s industrialised 
economies – Japan, Korea, and China – where the international competitiveness 
of manufacturing industries has been threatened by rising input costs. Energy 
costs have also proven challenging for the Region’s developing economies, where 
soaring fuel prices have drained government revenues and negatively impacted 
on the economic security of those living in poverty. In Indonesia, for example, 
energy subsidies to reduce fuel prices for households cost the government USD 
15 billion in 2009 – equivalent to 1.8 per cent of Indonesia’s GDP.xlii
Food security problems
The global resource boom has also posed food security problems across the 
Region. Given links between domestic and international agricultural markets, 
food prices paid by consumers have soared in both food importing and 
exporting economies. While all countries have been affected, food price inflation 
is a major issue in developing Asia, where both urban and rural poor are 
dangerously exposed to price rises. According to recent modelling by the Asian 
Development Bank, a 30 per cent increase in global food prices will increase the 
number of people living in poverty in developing Asia by 193 million. Indeed, 
links between food and social security were most recently exposed in 2008, 
when spiking grain prices set off protests and civil unrest amongst communities 
unable to access affordable food in many Asian countries. Environmental 
degradation associated with industrialisation – particularly through deforestation, 
urban encroachment on agricultural land, and water scarcity – all threaten to 
intensify regional food security difficulties in coming years.
 
The 2007-08 global food crisis and social unrest in Asia
In late 2007 and early 2008, world food prices rose rapidly. Drought in a 
number of cereal producing countries, declining national grain stocks and 
increased production costs due to high oil prices, saw the world price of wheat 
increase by 130 per cent and rice double in the first three months of 2008 
alone. While all food consumers were affected by these price spikes, their 
impact was especially pronounced for urban poor in the developing world 
who lack access to secure food supplies. Civil unrest and food riots broke out 
in 25 countries in early 2008, forcing many governments to deploy police and 
military to restore order and distribute emergency food supplies. Several Asian 
countries were embroiled, with India, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines 
all witnessing demonstration against high prices from food-insecure social 
groups. All four governments were forced to enact emergency food security 
measures in the wake of the crisis, including export bans, increased grain 
subsidies and food rationing.
Source: M. Schneider, ‘We are Hungry! A Summary Report of Food Riots, Government Responses, and 
States of Democracy in 2008’ http://www.corpethics.org/downloads/Hungry_rpt2008.pdf, 2008.
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Addressing resource insecurity
Resource insecurity in Asia will not be a transitory phenomenon. The 
International Energy Agency presently forecasts a 35 per cent growth in 
world energy consumption by 2035,xliv while the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation expects global cereals demand will rise by 32 per cent by  
2030.xlv As growth, industrialisation and urbanisation continues apace, we can 
expect resource scarcity to be a significant feature of the 21st century world 
economy. Herein, then, lies the resource challenge facing Asia: How to ensure 
secure and sustainable access to natural resources for the Region’s transforming 
economies in the face of increasing resource scarcity? 
The solution to Asia’s resource crisis arguably lies in a combination of two 
strategies. First, it is imperative to expand the production of minerals, food 
and energy in the Region in ways that are economically sustainable. Without 
increasing the available supply of natural resources, industrialisation and 
urbanisation in Asia will not be able to continue as it has over the last two 
decades. Second, it is essential to support and enhance resource trade 
and investment links between regional economies. The depth of regional 
interdependence, and the fact that many economies lack extensive reserves, 
means that resource security is a collective problem that cannot be addressed 
by individual governments alone.
At present, however, major barriers exist to increasing resource production 
and deepening integration within the Region, including price volatility and 
unpredictability in demand for resources. Recent developments in policy, 
occurring at both the national and international levels, threaten to exacerbate 
rather than improve regional resource security. 
The National Dimension: Supporting Resource Development
There is considerable scope for increased resource production in Asia. While 
some economies are comparatively resource poor, many have natural resource 
endowments that can be leveraged to help meet burgeoning regional demand. 
In some countries, this can involve developing unused resource reserves – with 
Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and China all possessing unexploited mineral, 
energy or agricultural resource bases. In others, it can involve the modernisation 
of primary industries to increase productivity from the existing resource 
base. For example, mechanisation and the application of modern agricultural 
techniques can increase farming yields throughout South and Southeast Asia. 
However several challenges are currently limiting the development of secure 
resource production systems in the Asia-Pacific.
Financing
The first challenge is financing. Whether building new oil and gas projects, 
disseminating modern agricultural practices, or increasing mining productivity, 
resource development is capital-intensive. Many economies in Asia lack the 
domestic savings to finance such projects on their own, making foreign direct 
investment crucial for resource development. Capital-rich but resource-poor 
consumer countries – such as Japan, China and Korea – have a key role to 
play, by providing the investment necessary to finance projects in producing 
countries. Indeed, such patterns of cross-regional resource investment are 
73
already well-developed in Australia. The Australian iron ore and coal export 
industries were established during the 1960s with some investment or contracts 
from Japanese companies, and in recent years Chinese investors have become 
an increasingly important partner, sponsoring 25 joint-venture iron ore projects 
in Western Australia.xlvi These investment relationships are mutually beneficial: 
providing Australia with competitive export industries while improving the 
resource security of its Northeast Asian partners.
Cross-regional resource investment is limited by the fact that many governments 
restrict – or entirely prohibit – FDI into resource sectors. Some governments, 
including Indonesia, China, India and Malaysia, require energy projects to be 
majority- or wholly-owned by state-owned enterprises. Others governments have 
recently placed regulatory limits on mining investment, including the Philippines 
(which placed a moratorium on issuing new mining permits in 2012) and 
Indonesia (where provisions demanding the 20 per cent ‘naturalisation’ of 
mining firms were enacted in 2010). Foreign ownership of agricultural land is 
politically controversial issue across the Region, and has seen many governments 
limit foreign investment flows. These kinds of restrictions limit cross-border 
resource investment between economies in Asia, making it harder to finance the 
modernisation and expansion of primary industries.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure is also a pressing issue for resource development. Resource 
projects typically have large infrastructural requirements: for transport facilities 
such as roads, rail and ports, and for water, energy and social services. The costs 
of resource infrastructure are increased by the fact that many resource projects 
are in remote and/or underdeveloped areas, where basic services are absent and 
construction costs are high. Resource infrastructure is a common-user asset – 
where the most efficient solution is typically for multiple enterprises to share in 
the use of a single set of facilities, whose construction and maintenance costs 
would otherwise exceed the financial capacity of any one user. Governments 
therefore have an important role in planning resource infrastructure provision, 
even if private sector involvement is sought through devices such as public-
private partnerships.
Nonetheless, resource infrastructure planning is difficult to get right. Resource 
markets are highly volatile, with prices rising and falling more rapidly than for 
other commodities. Resource investments also have long lead times, and can 
take up to a decade between planning and completion. This creates uncertainty 
for both governmental and private sector infrastructure planners, resulting in 
bottlenecks where infrastructure and service delivery lags behind the expanding 
needs of expanding resource enterprises. Capability issues pose additional 
challenges for developing countries, where a lack of local expertise and/or 
financial capacity limits progress in building resource infrastructure. Expanding 
regional resource production not only requires building mines and farms, but 
also ensuring that common-user infrastructure and services are provided in an 
appropriate and timely fashion. Addressing uncertainty and capability issues is 
therefore essential to meet resource infrastructural needs.
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Regulatory demands
Unfortunately, these financing and infrastructural challenges are being 
compounded by increasing regulatory demands from resource-producing 
governments in the Region. Many governments have exploited the global 
resources boom to engage in forms of resource nationalism – selective state 
intervention into resource markets for some kind of national or governmental 
gain. These interventions have taken a variety of forms, including governmental 
controls on resource exports, local ownership rules, increased and distortionary 
forms of resource taxation, and local processing requirements. Since the middle 
of the 2000s, resource nationalism has become widespread in Asia, with many 
governments increasing their regulatory demands on and control over firms in 
the mining, energy and agricultural sectors.xlvii
These creeping regulatory demands weaken the prospects for robust resource 
growth. Such policies impinge both on the profitability of firms, and their ability 
to compete freely in international markets, which deters private investment 
in new resource projects. They reduce business confidence in the stability of 
national policy regimes, a key precondition for investors given long project 
lead times. They also compound financing and infrastructural challenges, by 
limiting foreign investment flows and adding to the uncertainty surrounding the 
development of new resource projects. As a result, resource firms have become 
very cautious about investing in many of Asia’s major resource producing 
economies, preferring to focus on opportunities in more open jurisdictions 
elsewhere.
These national-level issues are exacerbating resource insecurity in the Region. 
Financing challenges, infrastructural concerns and increasingly restrictive 
regulatory environments are preventing primary industries in the Region 
from achieving their full productive potential. This not only affects producer 
economies, whose resource sectors are less productive than they might 
otherwise be, but also consumer economies whose resource security suffers 
due to diminished regional supply and high prices. As growth, industrialisation 
and urbanisation continues into the 21st century, resource demand in Asia will 
continue to rise. Unless these obstacles to resource development are addressed, 
resource insecurity in the Region is likely to worsen in coming years.
The International Dimension: Regionalising Resource Cooperation
Achieving resource security in Asia demands more than just addressing national-
level obstacles to resource investment. It also requires building reliable, secure 
and responsive supply networks between producers and consumers. No country 
in the Region can meet its needs for minerals, energy and food solely from 
domestic sources, making resource interdependence between economies 
essential. A well-developed international legal architecture – in the form of 
intergovernmental trade and investment agreements – is required for resource 
interdependence and supply networks to develop. While several efforts to 
promote regional resource cooperation are presently underway, the success of 
these efforts has so far been modest.
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Multilateral organisations 
Multilateral organisations have a key role to play in facilitating 
intergovernmental resource cooperation – by setting principles for 
policymaking, establishing shared rules and building trust between parties. 
Indeed, resource cooperation efforts have recently been launched in three 
regional organisations. In 2001, APEC launched its Energy Security Initiative, 
which called on members to share information on energy markets and 
harmonise national energy policies. This was followed in 2007 by the Darwin 
Declaration on Energy Security and the APEC Mining Policy Principles, which both 
called for a reduction in resource trade and investment barriers. The East Asia 
Summit issued its Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security in 2007, which 
focussed on supporting clean energy technologies and fostering open regional 
markets. For its part, ASEAN has issued five-year Energy Cooperation Actions Plans 
in 1999, 2004 and 2010, which detail a range of energy security strategies to 
be undertaken collectively by its members.
These multilateral efforts have laid the groundwork for deepening regional 
interdependence – particularly by establishing openness and market liberalism 
as a principle for resource cooperation. However, their achievements in going 
beyond principle setting have been less pronounced. The agreements have 
focussed primarily on outlining desired collective outcomes (such as trade 
liberalisation), but have left the concrete steps required to achieve these 
outcomes under-specified. These organisations are yet to develop legally 
enforceable agreements, with many of their commitments described as ‘non-
binding’ or ‘voluntary’ in official texts. Thus far, they have also focussed on 
relatively easy and low-stakes issues (such as energy efficiency promotion), while 
leaving more substantive but controversial issues (such as trade and investment 
rules) off the agenda. As a consequence, the strong declarative commitment 
of regional governments to resource market liberalisation is yet to manifest in 
concrete agreements from multilateral bodies.
National resources strategies
Compounding matters, many governments have chosen ‘go-it-alone’ responses 
to resource security. As world prices have surged, the governments of Japan, 
China, India and Korea all launched resource security strategies in the middle 
of the last decade. These strategies have sought to secure access to supplies 
of minerals and energy by having national companies – often, though not 
exclusively, state-owned – invest in resource projects in foreign countries. The 
rationale for these strategies is that national ownership at the site of production 
will give the country more privileged access to resource supplies than arm’s 
length purchases from international markets. A range of policies – including 
governmental financial assistance for foreign investment, and various forms 
of ‘resource diplomacy’ aimed at key supplier states – have been undertaken 
by these governments to help national firms take some ownership of resource 
projects abroad.xlviii 
The effectiveness of these consumer states’ resource security strategies is 
disputed. Some have argued they are essential to sponsor new projects which 
can satisfy soaring demand; while others contend that transparent international 
markets free from governmental interference will prove more stable and 
reliable. But regardless of their merits, their nationally focused approaches 
have politicised resource interdependence in the Region. The strategies involve 
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competition, as one country’s control of key suppliers may improve access by 
reducing the access enjoyed by other consumers. Indeed, a ‘race for resources’ 
has emerged between China, India, Japan and Korea, with each government 
racing to secure foreign resource projects in the face of competition from their 
peers. Such patterns of inter-consumer competition undermine trust between 
governments, and augurs poorly for future efforts to deepen cooperation at the 
multilateral level.
Consumer-producer tensions
There is also increasing evidence of consumer-producer tensions over resource 
issues in Asia. Producing governments’ nationalistic policy regimes have clashed 
with the resource security objectives of consumer governments, resulting in a 
range of bilateral resource disputes. Such tensions are exemplified by recent 
developments in Sino-Australia economic relations. Iron ore trade between these 
countries is unquestionably of mutual benefit: Western Australia provides around 
40 per cent of the iron ore used by the Chinese steel industry, while China 
accounts for close to three quarters of Western Australian iron ore production. 
However, the Chinese government has expressed concern over Australia’s 
foreign investment screening regime, which it argues unfairly restricts Chinese 
investors from the Australian mining sector. These types of disagreements do 
little to build trust or cooperation amongst the major resource players in the 
region and may exacerbate price volatility in the Region. 
FTAs and resources cooperation
When regional governments began aggressively negotiating FTAs during the 
early 2000s, resource issues were not high on the trade agenda. But as world 
prices have surged, governments have increasingly looked to incorporate 
resource cooperation initiatives into their FTAs. Since the mid-2000s, 11 FTAs 
including resource-related provisions have been agreed between producing and 
consuming governments in the regions, and a further 15 are currently under 
negotiation or study.xlix These FTAs typically include one of three legal devices to 
promote resource interdependence: tariff concessions for primary commodities; 
investment policy provisions offering protection to foreign resource investors; 
and ‘resource cooperation clauses’ committing the governments to some 
form of policy dialogue. These agreements have had a major impact in terms 
of building trust between parties, and establishing bilateral mechanisms for 
resource policy cooperation.
However, FTAs are not a universal panacea for promoting resource 
interdependence. First, there are limits to what can be achieved in these 
FTAs, due to concerns about national policy autonomy. Most producing 
governments have agreed to most-favoured-nation but not the more stringent 
national treatment investment protections for resource industries; and none 
have agreed to limit their use of quantitative resource trade controls. Second, 
these FTAs have focussed predominantly on trade and investment rules, but do 
not cover many of the so-called ‘WTO-Plus’ issues relevant to resource sectors, 
such as government procurement, services, infrastructure, competition law 
and intellectual property. Third, only bilateral FTAs have addressed resource 
issues, as the multilateral ASEAN and ASEAN-China FTAs do not contain such 
provisions. The inherently multilateral nature of resource interdependence in 
Asia means that bilateral FTAs are at best a partial solution to the Region’s 
resource security challenges.
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These considerations suggest there is a need to improve intergovernmental 
resource cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The foundations for such regional 
cooperation already exist, in the form of bilateral FTAs and multilateral 
dialogues at APEC, ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. But the achievements of 
these existing initiatives are modest at best, and emerging resource disputes 
between governments clearly demonstrates the need for more to be done. 
Improving the national-level climate for resource investment will only go halfway 
towards addressing resource insecurity in Asia. If intergovernmental architectures 
for trade and investment are not augmented, the mutually beneficial patterns of 
resource interdependence in the Region will not develop to their full potential.
Western Australia and Asian Resource Security
Challenges to resource security in Asia are clearly pressing. National level 
obstacles to expanding resource production need to be addressed, alongside a 
deepening of intergovernmental efforts to foster resource trade and investment 
links between regional economies. Importantly, both Western Australia and 
Australia as a whole are well placed to productively contribute to the Region’s 
resource challenges. Many policies and initiatives are already in place, but more 
can be done within Western Australia to help strengthen resource security and 
interdependence in Asia.
Production
First, Western Australia will play an increasingly important role as a supplier to 
regional partners. Western Australia is richly endowed with the natural resources 
needed by Asian economies – particularly iron ore, base metals, natural gas 
and agricultural land suitable for grain and pastoral production. Output of 
these commodities is already rapidly expanding with West Australian iron ore 
production almost tripling from 171 to 476 million tonnes per annum between 
2002 and 2012.l The prospects for sustained production increases in the 
coming years are good. While some transport supply chains – particularly in 
the Pilbara for iron ore – remain challenging, much has already been done to 
put in place the infrastructure needed to sustain growing resource exports from 
Western Australia over the coming decades.
Investment
Governmental policy settings make Western Australia an ideal location for 
resource investment. Unlike many resource-producing governments, Australia 
has an open foreign investment regime. While foreign investment in mining 
and agriculture must pass a ‘national interest test’ administered by the Foreign 
Investment Review Board, the overwhelming majority of investment applications 
have been approved in recent years.5 Neither the Western Australian nor 
Commonwealth governments have engaged in many of the common forms of 
resource nationalism seen in their peers, such as performance requirements, 
trade restrictions and distortionary export taxes. As a result of this policy stance, 
  5 Since 2001, only one business investment proposal has been rejected by the Treasurer through the FIRB – the 
takeover of the Australia Securities Exchange by the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2010. See Foreign Investment 
Review Board. Foreign Investment Review Board Annual Report 2010-11. Canberra, Department of Treasury, 
2012, p. xv. For a detailed review of Australia’s foreign investment policy in the mining and energy sectors, 
see J.D. Wilson, ‘Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australia’s approach to Chinese 
investment in its minerals sector’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 3, 2011, pp. 283-304.
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Australia is considered to be one of the safest countries for resource investment, 
and in 2012 consultancy Behre Dolbear ranked it first in its global assessment 
of political risk in the mining industry.li This open and market-based policy 
framework ideally places Western Australia to continue to attract investment and 
expand resource production in future years.
Regional industry development
Western Australia also has an important role to play in helping to modernise 
and expand resource production in other countries in the Region. As identified 
in Chapter 6 of this report, Western Australia has extensive technical capabilities 
in many areas relevant to primary industry – particularly in agricultural 
and veterinary science, mining services, and resource infrastructure. These 
capabilities can be leveraged to assist resource development efforts in partners 
in the Region, where such capabilities are presently in high demand. Part 
of this effort can be driven by the private sector, via foreign investment into 
regional countries by Australian mining and agricultural businesses, as well as 
through increased mining and agricultural service exports. But as some of these 
capabilities are located within universities, state agencies and public research 
institutions, governments also have a role to play. The Western Australian 
and Commonwealth governments can assist these efforts by encouraging and 
supporting technical cooperation initiatives between public sector bodies and 
their counterparts in the Region.
Model of reliable supplier
Finally, Western Australia should continue to emphasise its role as a reliable 
resource supplier to its Asian partners. As a result of increasing resource 
competition and insecurity within the Region, many consumer governments 
have become anxious about access to resource supplies. Western Australia is 
already a reliable resource supplier. Maintaining an open and market-based 
trade and investment framework will be critical in ensuring this role continues. 
Nonetheless, some governments – particularly China and Japan – have 
expressed concerns over their access to the Australian resource sector. Therefore, 
more could be done to politically reassure partners this open and market-based 
stance will continue. One avenue could be the inclusion of ‘resource clauses’ 
in free trade agreements currently being negotiated by the Commonwealth 
government, in which Australia can commit to resource policy dialogue and 
cooperation with consumers. There is also a role for the state government, in 
emphasising resource policy stability and openness via its trade facilitation 
and economic diplomacy efforts throughout the Region. Deepening technical 
cooperation, through both state and Commonwealth government agencies, will 
also go a long way to reassuring resource partners that Australia will remain a 
reliable supplier, committed to contributing towards regional resource security 
in the coming years.
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Recommendations
 Recommendation 9
 Governments in the Region have pursued bilateral trade agreements 
to address resources security, which have helped build trust between 
parties. However, there are limits to how far this approach can promote 
resource security, as it has yet to move beyond dialogue processes to 
deeper forms of policy cooperation. Bilateral FTAs and multilateral 
dialogues offer a foundation but governments need to harmonise and 
coordinate their resources policies though intergovernmental cooperation 
across the Region. 
 Recommendation 10
 As a global resources industry hub, Western Australia has a key role to 
play in addressing the issue of resources security. This is about Western 
Australia not only doing what it already does well, but also doing more 
in this vein. First, it is well placed to substantially expand and sustain 
its supply of minerals, energy and food production well into the future. 
The ongoing delivery of food quality is worthy of special mention 
given the growing market in this area. Second, more can be made of 
Western Australia’s role as a reliable resources supplier in the Region, 
especially by promoting its favourable investment settings of resources 
policy stability and openness. Third, the State’s resources expertise has 
great potential to help build and expand resources production in other 
countries in the Region.
 Recommendation 11
 Given the scale of the problem, it should be emphasised that Western 
Australia can make a very strong contribution to meeting the challenges 
surrounding food security in the Region. In particular, its research and 
technical expertise in such areas as agriculture and veterinary science, 
grains development, water management, environmental sustainability 
and transportation logistics are all key capacities required to improve the 
food security situation. Western Australia is in a prime position to help 
advance capacity building in these areas across the Region and there 
are already research partnerships underway. Government, business and 
the scientific community are urged to pursue this agenda with vigour 
through greater regional collaboration and cooperation. 
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Country brief: 
INDIA
India is the second most populous country in the world with two-thirds of its 
population under 35 years of age and a growing middle class. It is the world’s 
10th largest economy (in nominal GDP terms). Since 1991, when market-based 
economic reforms were introduced, the Indian economy has grown at well 
above the world average. The annual average growth rate was more than 7 per 
cent between 2002 and 2012 though current estimates are at around 4-5 per 
cent for 2013-2014. India is a federal constitutional democracy made up of 28 
states and seven union territories.6 Indian society is multi-lingual, multi-ethnic 
and pluralistic, and has a robust free media. It also faces significant challenges 
including poverty, malnutrition, rapid urbanisation, internal and border security 
issues, and an array of infrastructure and governance problems. Australia and 
India share certain historical-cultural and sporting links, and there are strong 
people-to-people connections. From Indian independence up to the end of the 
20th century there were varied attempts to bolster Australia-India diplomatic 
relations. Since the early 2000s however, the relationship has begun to grow in 
a more sustained way. 
The Commission’s Delhi consultations provided the opportunity to hear a range 
of voices on India’s current situation and future prospects, and how Australia 
and Western Australia may figure in these considerations. The following provides 
some snapshots of these views.
  6 There are currently moves in Congress to divide the state of Andhra Pradesh into two though amidst great 
controversy.
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
Challenges
•	 Despite	the	burgeoning	middle	class,	absolute	poverty	remains	a	huge	
problem In India. This is related to the urban-rural divide, but also an 
issue associated with mega-cities. Research on the ground suggests 
that connecting metropolitan cores with their peripheries can offer the 
benefits of urbanisation while avoiding the downsides of massive urban 
agglomerations. However, this requires far better coordination between 
land use planning and infrastructure planning, and a raft of institutional 
reforms to underpin it.7
•	 India	is	internally	very	diverse	and	there	are	major	differences	between	
individual Indian states. This presents many problems, administrative 
and regulatory, for doing business especially in cases that involve several 
states such as in the resources area. Moreover, public policy and public 
administration is subject to a great deal of bureaucratic inertia and lack 
of consistency. This has significant impact across Indian society including 
on the ability to address issues of inclusion, sustainability, and efficiency.
 7 World Bank India, Urbanization beyond municipal boundaries: Nurturing metropolitan economies and connecting 
peri-urban areas in India. World Bank, 2013.
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•	 Infrastructure	challenges	are	multiple	with	major	ramifications	on	
such issues as food security and spoilage, healthcare, and education. 
Capacity deficits are part of this, for example, the dearth of qualified 
engineers and the more general effect of India’s brain drain. Government 
has engaged in public private partnerships to address some of the 
infrastructure problems but has struggled with how to make full use of 
them.
•	 Increasing	education	levels	and	skills	training	are	particularly	urgent	
priorities to meet the growing needs of developing India. Among the 
middle classes, addressing this gap domestically is complicated by a 
strong preference for their children to enter the top universities, which 
have limited places.
On Australia and Western Australia
•	 There	are	many	great	opportunities	for	Australia	and	Western	Australia	
to work with India. Food, minerals and energy resources are obvious 
items of mutual interest. There are already substantial links in the 
areas of education and services, but more could be done in the fields 
of agriculture, science and technology, and investment, as well as on 
joint venturing in third countries. Key here is dramatically increasing the 
knowledge and awareness of each other’s capacities and needs. 
•	 Australians’	perceptions	of	India	can	be	dated	and	Australian	businesses	
can often tend to approach India with unwelcome attitudes such as 
‘we’re here to help.’ Because of their size and growth, there is also 
a tendency to view India as if it was the same as China with little 
appreciation of how different they are and that different approaches are 
required. 
•	 India	is	Australia’s	largest	source	of	permanent	and	skilled	migrants,	
and there are strong people-to-people connections via family, business 
and education. Australia is seen as a nice place to visit but there is little 
knowledge about Western Australia’s specific strengths and expertise. 
Much work needs to be done to build the knowledge base about 
Australia and Western Australia in India.
•	 India	is	an	important	power	in	the	Indian	Ocean	context	and	its	major	
security concerns are with China and Pakistan. Its concerns about China 
in particular has been a factor in strengthening India’s security ties with 
Australia as well as the US and Japan.
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Emerging leaders perspectives
•	 There	is	a	strong	sense	of	policy	stasis	afflicting	Indian	politics,	with	
the view that this will not change soon. More generally, while great 
challenges are facing contemporary India, the political system is 
seen as faltering with problems of nepotism, aging politicians, lack 
of accountability, and policy formation stifled by too much politics. 
Administrative and governance systems require dramatic reform but this 
will only come about with fresh leadership and the development of a new 
big picture for India’s growth and development. The current controversy 
over online freedom of speech is seen as part of a larger story of how 
technology can assist to mobilize people to influence change. 
•	 Gender	inequality	is	seen	as	a	major	issue	in	Indian	society	in	need	
of serious attention. Recent high profile cases of sexual violence are 
symptomatic of a far deeper and more pervasive problem. Addressing 
gender inequality is integrally linked to the broader human rights and 
equality agendas in India.
•	 Concerns	were	voiced	about	India’s	security	issues,	including	terrorism	
threats, the tensions with Pakistan and China, and about the more 
general issues around security in the Indian Ocean and the US presence.
•	 The	emerging	leaders	have	very	clear	views	about	the	magnitude	and	
complexity of the problems confronting India but they also express great 
confidence about the nation’s ability to maintain high levels of economic 
growth. 
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Chapter 5
Engagement  
and Diplomacy 
Previous chapters have examined some of the major trends in Asia’s rise and 
the more specific detail on economic trends, trade integration and resources 
issues. As this analysis has shown, ongoing economic prosperity and mutual 
benefit cannot be assumed but needs to be actively pursued if opportunities 
are to be realised and challenges addressed. In terms of economic engagement, 
Australia and Western Australia are now very much a part of the Region. This 
engagement however does not necessarily extend beyond the transactional, 
at least in the minds of some. Narrow and shallow connections do not sustain 
mutually beneficial relationships over time. In order to avoid the pitfalls of 
short-term opportunism, efforts need to be made by industry and the wider 
community to cultivate a stronger sense of a shared regional future and the 
accompanying commitments. Current circumstances are ripe for this to occur but 
it requires strategic choices to be made and the development of new approaches 
on how national and sub-national actors can be best integrated into the process. 
Engaging in the Region
A key question currently in circulation in Australia is how it might proceed both 
to benefit from and help to shape the Region’s ongoing prosperity. While there 
has been a good deal of discussion on this issue, the Commission considered 
it important to highlight several aspects that it found have not received due 
attention so far. These items are addressed particularly to our Australian 
audiences.
Australia faces a somewhat exceptional foreign policy challenge. Unlike other 
Western democracies, most countries central to Australia’s foreign policy focus 
are not only ethnically different but also come from quite different historical, 
cultural and political traditions. This places a substantial relative responsibility 
on Australia not only to accord greater priority to educating its domestic 
community about the Region, but a heavier requirement to propagate among 
Australia’s neighbours a sense of what Australia is about as a nation. These 
responsibilities do not lie just with the federal and state government but with 
the leadership in business, education, policy circles and the media.
The second issue is constancy. In recent years Australia as a nation has 
acknowledged the resurgence of Asia. But there is more required than this. 
Australia can ill afford complacency and to simply congratulate itself on a job 
well done. Its efforts must be ongoing and relentless. Australia has to understand 
the importance of patience and long-term relationships as it engages in the 
Region. It must avoid the trap of wooing a country when it is fashionable to 
do so. For example, Japan was the focus in the 70s and 80s, Indonesia in the 
1990s, and China and India over the past decade. These relationships cannot be 
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switched on and off at the flick of a switch. Countries, like people, remember. 
While some nations may loom large at times, it is also important to continue to 
sustain longstanding relationships. 
The third issue concerns balance. It is neither in Australia’s national nor 
subnational interests to see the Region only in terms of its potential benefit to 
Australia. Foreign policy is about furthering interests. But if Australian foreign 
policy becomes driven by the visible short-term benefit to Australia, as it can 
be, the long term benefits of trust and unspoken reciprocity with its regional 
neighbours will be eroded. Ultimately this will be contrary to the long-term 
interests of Australia.
Underlying all of these points is the observation that nothing is static. The various 
scenarios outlined in Chapter 1 indicate the potential for major changes to 
occur in the political, economic and social dynamics of the Region. In some 
of the less sanguine alternatives, Australia might have to radically rethink its 
external policies. But even in the absence of major changes to regional political 
configurations, national and subnational diplomacy will have to remain alert and 
flexible. Changes in leadership have recently taken place in China, Japan and 
Korea. In 2014 there will be elections of potentially enormous significance in 
India and Indonesia.
These changes will be happening against a background of societal shifts in Asia 
that, while different in each country, frequently have the common hallmark 
of generational change. There is nothing particularly novel about this. What is 
different in current times is the degree of acceleration in technological change 
that now often seems to accompany political change. The speed and apparent 
suddenness of events have a growing propensity to surprise, as the turmoil in 
the Middle East over recent years has underlined.
There is no magic prescription for Australia at the national or subnational level to 
be able to deal with these types of changes in the Region. Nonetheless, it is of 
paramount importance to be alert to regional events, to evaluate their impact on 
Australia, and where possible, to influence those events. This suggests a wider 
diplomatic focus that is not simply government-to-government. The tools of 
public diplomacy could be more widely utilised offering a means to interact and 
engage more broadly with those thinkers and opinion makers generating new 
social and political currents among Australia’s neighbours. 
On a positive note, differences in perspective with some of Australia’s 
neighbours may be converging, particularly among the cohort of emerging 
generations. Two decades ago, the advocacy of causes relevant to good 
governance, human rights (including those relating to gender) and corruption 
were largely seen as Western fixed ideas. This is no longer the case.
There is an increasing awareness, particularly among young leaders, on issues 
to do with corruption, governance and gender inequality in India, China 
and Indonesia. These issues have traditionally been the cause of occasional 
friction between Australia and some of its neighbours, sometimes intensified 
by exaggerated media coverage. However, change coming from within Asia’s 
societies, particularly from those who will within a few years move to leadership 
positions, seems to indicate that there is some convergence growing on these 
issues.
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Australian Foreign Policy and the States
While Australian foreign policy falls within the constitutional prerogative of the 
Commonwealth there is no reason why a state should not make its views known 
in areas of direct relevance, whether this be its own economic interests or wider 
considerations. Western Australia has particular interests in minerals and energy 
policy and arguably policy relating to the Indian Ocean region. Tasmania has 
interests in fisheries issues and Antarctica. Moreover all states in the federation 
are entitled to take a view on foreign policy generally because, notwithstanding 
the constitutional responsibilities of the Commonwealth, they have a collective 
stake in Australia’s future.
Among the big challenges facing contemporary Asia, there are three closely 
interrelated security subsets in which Western Australia has a major stake. 
The first is energy and resources, where Western Australia leads as Australia’s 
preeminent resources producer. The second is food production. Western 
Australia, especially in the area of wheat production, is an important participant 
in Australia’s national endeavor to continue to be a reliable supplier to meet 
Asian food needs. The third is water and environmental management. Western 
Australia’s experience and expertise in dealing with water resources and 
environmental protection in demanding conditions places it well to make a 
major contribution to how this issue is addressed across a range of contexts 
in the Region. It is as much in the long-term interests of Western Australia to 
rally its capacities and expertise to meet these urgent challenges as it is in the 
interests of the Region. 
The federal framework of the Australian Commonwealth has traditionally 
defined the limits of how far a state such as Western Australia can contribute to 
foreign policymaking. However, in contemporary global conditions, subnational 
regions and large cities are increasingly called upon to play important roles as 
distinct economic actors and as key zones of economic activity. While remaining 
within the domain of national sovereignty, these subnational units are now 
engaging in new modes of operation in the facilitation of economic activity 
across national borders. This prompts a need to consider the adequacy of 
current Australian practices at the state and national levels, especially in regard 
to how the two may be working in tandem or otherwise.
The Commonwealth and States in the Regional Engagement Mix 
The Australian federation has a number of similarities with other federal nations 
such as Canada. But unlike Canada, no Australian state has a land border with 
another sovereign nation and thus there are no cross border issues to navigate. 
An upshot of this is that to the extent that they exist, distinct Australian state 
identities have tended to emerge out of endogenous experiences. In the Western 
Australian case, the economy is quite different from the rest of the country. This 
often has an impact on political interaction and policy negotiation between 
Western Australian and Commonwealth governments. Current conditions 
demand some critical reflection on how this relationship is evolving or should 
evolve. 
In the contemporary age of globalisation the lines between a federal nation’s 
internal affairs (some of which falls under state jurisdiction) and its external 
relations (predominately a federal government responsibility) have become 
more blurred. The areas in question include the environment, aspects of foreign 
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commerce, foreign investment and land tenure, education of foreign students 
and promotion of tourism. In terms of policy, this blurring of domain has been 
evident in two areas: first, in the international diplomatic activity conducted by 
states; and second, in the federal government’s negotiation of treaties and in 
particular multilateral and bilateral trade treaties in recent decades.
State government diplomacy
Up until the 1960s, the Australian states’ overseas representation was 
overwhelmingly based in London. Since then it has broadened first to the 
United States, then Japan, and during the 80s and 90s to elsewhere in Asia. 
Western Australia has significant representation in Asia alongside Victoria and 
Queensland. In the wake of this trend, varying perspectives have emerged on 
the efficacy of diplomatic engagement by state governments. Two divergent 
views can be ascribed as indicative.
Overseas Representation – Australian state governments
STATE REPRESENTATION
WA
6 countries, 8 offices
China: Shanghai; Hangzhou
Japan: Tokyo; Kobe
Singapore: Singapore
Indonesia: Jakarta
India: Mumbai
ROK: Seoul
VIC
5 countries, 10 offices
China: Shanghai; Beijing; Nanjing; 
Chengdu; Hong Kong 
India: Bangalore; Mumbai
Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur
Indonesia: Jakarta
Japan: Tokyo
QLD
5 countries, 8 offices
China: Shanghai; Beijing; Hong Kong; 
Guangzhou
Taiwan: Taipei
India: Bangalore
Japan: Tokyo
ROK: Seoul
NSW
2 countries, 3 offices
China: Guangzhou; Shanghai
India: Mumbai
Plans to open in Malaysia, ROK, 
Singapore and Indonesia
TAS
3 countries; 3 offices
China
Japan
Singapore 
SA
1 country; 2 offices
China: Jinan; Hong Kong
NT
0
NT ostensibly has tourism offices in 
Singapore, China and Japan but all 
correspondence is directed to its Sydney 
representative.
ACT 0
 
Source: Compiled from state government websites
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A Western Australian view—no doubt with resonance for other states—
would be that its priorities abroad are not always the same as those of the 
Commonwealth. From this perspective, the state is entitled to further its own 
interests. As a resources rich and export oriented economy, Western Australia 
may consider that it has a specific interest in South Asian and North Asian 
markets, including on investment. The state’s geographical location would also 
recommend that it have its own dealings with South East Asia and Indian Ocean 
countries. Many Australian businesses appreciate the support offered by state-
based trade agencies, which have special expertise that complements that of 
Austrade. This seemed especially the case where companies perceived that their 
state office had a closer appreciation of their local circumstances and specific 
needs. 
A Commonwealth view would be that it is useful for the states to have their 
own representation particularly in terms of inward investment promotion 
and on routine everyday matters such as managing visits by state ministers. 
Major existing investors and customers know about the powers of the state 
government. However, in this view, most foreign governments do not want 
to have dealings with a sub-national government and in many cases do not 
understand the Australian federal system. While Britain, New Zealand and 
Canada may have some sense of an Australian state’s status, even in these 
countries there can be limited understanding of their sovereign responsibilities. 
From the Commonwealth perspective, state offices are seen to have issues 
accessing governments, a limitation that usually requires Australian embassy 
assistance, particularly with national governments and even foreign state 
governments. State overseas offices are seen as costly and duplicate what the 
Federal government does or could do. The small size of these offices means that 
state representatives often have to act across a range of activities, which may 
well be an inefficient use of resources.
Both views would agree that there can be considerable value in state premiers 
making regular and targeted visits to key markets and sources of investment. 
These visits should focus on major business links, with governments fostering 
such connections through the cultivation of long-term relationships and mutual 
understanding. To a lesser extent there would be agreement on the merit in 
relevant state ministers undertaking industry specific visits. In some instance 
there have been advantages from Premiers taking small groups (up to 10) of 
senior business people with them. Larger groups seem to be less effective in 
developing connections. Anecdotal accounts from New South Wales and Victoria 
as well as from the Canadian federal government suggest that large business 
delegations accompanying political leaders may have domestic political benefits 
but have limited effects in terms of fostering business growth.
On the ground there is variation in the operations of state offshore offices and 
there are frequent discussions within Australian state governments as to how 
their interests are best served overseas. Some states mainly use their own offices 
while some use their own in conjunction with Austrade. Other states rely heavily 
on Austrade to represent their interests abroad. Most of these offices work well 
with the local Commonwealth offices. Yet a few do not. This is not a unique 
situation. In the Canadian case for example similar differences emerge. The 
biggest province, Ontario, has all its representatives as designated provincial 
representatives in Canadian foreign missions. Quebec is a case unto itself. The 
province with the most overseas offices is Alberta – another commodity-based 
economy like Western Australia.
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A number of Australian state governments have established their own 
representatives and offices in countries in the Region. These offices are able 
to concentrate on the pursuit of state-specific interests, often complemented 
by the functions of the Australian Commonwealth government’s overseas 
missions. Coordination and cooperation is important between the two levels of 
government to limit duplication and to avoid confusion and the potential to 
send mixed messages, especially in countries unfamiliar with Australia’s federal 
system. There is scope to consider the efficacy of current state-federal interaction 
in this area, and whether things can be done better, domestically and in the 
field. 
In cases where resources are stretched, the Canadian case offers some alternative 
approaches to state level overseas representation. One option is to consolidate 
resources by assigning national diplomatic status to a state’s representatives 
and locate them in Commonwealth foreign missions. The state representatives 
would retain their distinct state identity and mission in these arrangements. The 
merits of this approach include the potential to avoid confusion and duplication 
and to achieve cost savings. Another option is to concentrate state offices in a 
few major centres strategic to a state’s specific interests and ensure that they 
are properly resourced. In this option, state representation could possibly use 
Commonwealth offices in smaller countries and report to the relevant state 
department.
Intergovernmental cooperation
The other main area in which Australian federal and state responsibilities have 
been at times blurred relates to the Commonwealth’s constitutional powers 
over foreign affairs. Two specific situations can be highlighted. The first is the 
Commonwealth’s use of its constitutional powers to override a state’s legal 
authority on issues that would otherwise fall within the state’s jurisdiction. The 
second is the case where the Commonwealth negotiates and implements treaties 
with implications for state interests.
The High Court of Australia has consistently adjudicated that only the 
Commonwealth government can speak for Australia in international affairs, 
including on treaty negotiations. States can enter into international arrangements 
but with less than treaty status (normally in the form of Memoranda of 
Understanding). The High Court has also supported the Commonwealth 
Parliament’s use of legislation to implement treaties, where implementation 
impacts on areas normally under the jurisdiction of a state. Prominent past 
examples include the use of world heritage treaties to override state approval 
of development projects, and human rights treaties to override states legislation 
regarding Indigenous peoples. Over the past two decades however, there is 
increasingly the trend towards the Commonwealth and the states working 
more closely on foreign relations issues. In part, this has arisen because of the 
difficulty in practice of pushing federal legislation through the Senate where 
there has been significant state opposition.
In the area of treaty negotiations, practice has shifted. Up until the 1980s, the 
rights of states to impede implementation of treaties were protected by the use 
of a so-called federal clause (in which the Commonwealth would only accept 
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responsibility for those matters within its traditional constitutional authority). 
However, this measure was abandoned in 1983. Subsequently, protection of 
state prerogatives is based largely on the ‘Principles and Procedures’ protocol 
for consultation between the states. These provide that, where appropriate, a 
state or territory representative be included in relevant Australian delegations. 
Joint efforts on investment also illustrate a more cooperative approach 
emerging. In the last two years there has been a good deal of work done 
by Austrade and relevant state departments on overcoming duplication on 
investment promotion and follow up policies. This has involved the allocation of 
specific tasks to each state according to sector. It has also entailed a distribution 
of responsibilities for each stage of the inward investment process broadly 
between Austrade and the states. The efficacy of the new arrangements is 
still to be fully tested but they do project a thoughtful and more cooperative 
tendency to issues of common concern. Other coordinating mechanisms have 
been floated to link-up Commonwealth offices and their state counterparts 
though hitherto unrealised. The multilevel character of the global and regional 
settings would suggest that the need to further develop Commonwealth-state 
coordinating mechanisms and cooperative arrangements is imperative, especially 
in trans-borders areas such as education, investment and the environment.
In the final analysis, there is good sense in attempts to ensure that the external 
operations of the Commonwealth and of Western Australia keep in some form 
of alignment. Undoubtedly, different parts of Australia have different external 
emphases but there is little to be gained if each is engaged in pursuing lone 
enterprises overseas. This is a recipe for confusing existing and potential 
partners, and runs the risk of projecting Australia as a fragmented nation. 
Distinctive features and competitive edges are important to emphasise in the 
pursuit of subnational interests. But operational differences are best addressed 
domestically rather than displayed regionally. There is some scope to further 
develop coordination and cooperation strategies in this area to maximise the 
benefits of economic diplomacy for both the states and Commonwealth.lii
Recommendations
 Recommendation 12
 Governments, as well as leadership in business, education, and civil society, 
need to be careful to avoid complacency in the conduct of Australia’s 
regional relations, especially given that nothing is static in the Region. 
While some nations may loom large at one moment, it is important not to 
forget or take for granted longstanding regional relationships. 
 Recommendation 13
 In regional partnerships, government, industry and NGOs should undertake 
the development of professional exchanges and sabbatical programs to share 
and develop good governance practices and capacity building in the 
public and private sectors. The experience of pooling knowledge and 
witnessing how things can be done differently is seen to be particularly 
relevant to addressing the issue of corruption, with its negative impacts 
on conducting business and the efficient running of government.
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 Recommendation 14
 Schools, universities and research institutions, with the positive aid and 
support of government, should up-scale student exchanges & research 
collaborations and partnerships in the Region. These types of regional 
programs and partnerships have many direct educational and 
research benefits but also deepen a wider sense of common purpose 
and reciprocity. These efforts should also be linked to the greater 
development of alumni and other networks for ongoing understanding 
and mutual benefit. 
 Recommendation 15
 Given the growing involvement of Australian states in the facilitation of 
regional economic engagement there is a need to further develop robust 
state-federal intergovernmental mechanisms to deal with these matters 
in relation to policy and international negotiations as well as field 
operations. These mechanisms would be helpful in the advancement 
of greater cooperation and coordination between federal and state 
governments, especially on trans-border issues such as trade, investment, 
education and the environment. 
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Country brief: 
JAPAN
The population of Japan is c.127 million and is rapidly ageing. It is the 
world’s fourth largest economy (in purchasing power parity terms). After 
three decades of spectacular growth, the Japanese economy slowed markedly 
in the 1990s, after which it experienced modest growth in the 2000s. The 
massive earthquake and tsunami disaster in March 2011 had a calamitous 
effect on the economy but in 2012 it returned to positive growth (1.9 per 
cent nominal GDP). There is ongoing domestic debate about restructuring 
the Japanese economy for growth and how to reduce the huge national debt 
(c.245 per cent of GDP). Japan is a democratic constitutional monarchy, and is 
linguistically and culturally homogenous (with 98.5 per cent of the population 
ethnically Japanese). Australia has a longstanding relationship with Japan 
centred on substantial economic ties, security and defence cooperation, shared 
commitments to good global citizenship, and wide-ranging people-to-people 
connections. 
In its Tokyo consultations, the Commission heard a range of voices on Japan’s 
current situation and future prospects, and how Australia and Western Australia 
may figure in these considerations. The following provides some snapshots of 
these views.
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Challenges
•	 A	central	issue	facing	Japan	is	the	stalling	of	the	Japanese	economy	
and the need for fundamental structural reform. The task confronting 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government is how to achieve growth and 
at the same time reduce debt. Abe is in a strong position to undertake 
reform, enjoying high public popularity, no immediate leadership rivals, 
and a large majority in the Diet. The implementation of ‘Abenomics’ 
is beginning to produce some positive results in the economy with an 
increase in exports. In addition the decision to raise the consumption tax 
rate in 2014 to reduce national debt has been welcomed by a majority 
of Japanese as well as overseas investors. Nonetheless Abe also has to 
manage a range of vested interests in areas badly in need of reform. 
•	 The	challenge	of	an	ageing	population	in	Japan	and	its	implications	
for economic growth is vexed. It is already having adverse effects in 
higher education, where universities are battling to fill places, and in 
labour markets. There are suggestions that far higher levels of female 
participation in the workforce would help but this has to contend with 
traditional views about women’s proper place being in the home. 
Immigration is one possible solution but there are concerns that this 
would dilute Japanese identity and way of life.
Direct flights to Tokyo
• From Sydney: 14 per week
FTA negotiations since 
August 2007
PTA/FTA
Air 
8,165
66,922
Japanese students in Australia
of total Australian trade
13.7%
Two-way 
merchandise 
trade, 2012 (A$m)
Education
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•	 Energy	supply	is	a	critical	issue	for	the	Japanese	economy	and	public	
policy. This has become highly charged after the Fukushima disaster 
and the closing down of Japan’s entire nuclear power program. This has 
produced the imperative to rethink Japan’s energy mix. What this may 
look like in the immediate future is a technical and supply puzzle, but 
also a highly charged political problem.
•	 In	the	area	of	strategic	security,	the	Abe	government	has	committed	to	
the establishment of a national security council as well as allowing Japan 
to exercise the right to collective defence. This has the potential to further 
complicate Japan-China and Japan-Korea relations, with implications for 
wider regional security.
On Australia and Western Australia
•	 There	is	a	certain	feeling	in	Japan	of	neglect	in	the	longstanding	
relationship with Australia because of the rise of China. Australia needs 
to ensure that it does not appear to be just focused on China. The 
newly elected Coalition federal government in Australia has made the 
relationship with Japan a priority, sending an important signal in this 
regard, as have the ongoing efforts of the Western Australian government 
to maintain and strengthen the Japan relationship. There is great 
potential for further developing the relationship. This can be achieved by 
connecting at a range of levels including business-to-business, city-to-city, 
and university-to-university.
•	 While	people-to-people	relations	have	been	strong,	older	friendship	links	
and networks are fading as those involved are aging. Japanese students 
are travelling less overseas to study and younger Japanese tend to be 
more interested in things Japanese. If they do travel, it is to other ‘Asian’ 
countries in the Region rather than Australia. In the wider Japanese 
community there is a poor grasp of Australia and its culture. 
•	 There	is	great	potential	to	further	develop	bilateral	trade	and	investment	
relations, especially for Western Australia in the areas of energy 
(uranium, hydrogen, LNG), high-end food and beverage produce, 
defence science and technology, and investment. Australian marketing 
and branding into Japan needs to be better informed about local 
Japanese culture and sensitivities to gain market traction and to avoid 
offence. 
•	 There	are	various	opportunities	for	further	developing	professional	
exchanges, as well as research collaborations. English language 
proficiency among Japanese researchers, and vice versa, can present 
difficulties for engaging in global scholarly circles. Nevertheless, there 
are significant collaboration possibilities for Australian and Japanese 
researchers to work together on joint projects combining their varied 
capacities. 
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Emerging leaders perspectives
•	 The	emerging	leaders	reiterated	concerns	about	the	economic	situation	
and the impediments to structural reform. The difficulties encountered 
with the proposal to raise consumption tax were seen as indicative of 
the larger challenge. Although having a big majority in the Diet, Prime 
Minister Abe nonetheless has to deal with many vested interests in his 
parliamentary ranks.
•	 The	ageing	population	is	a	well-recognised	problem	because	of	its	
limiting effect on Japan’s ability to pursue economic growth. There is 
potential for far greater participation of women in the workforce and this 
would help the situation. But, there remain some well-entrenched views 
about the role of women being primarily in the domestic sphere. 
•	 Immigration	may	be	another	way	to	help	address	the	aging	population	
issue and to aid future growth. In principle immigration was seen as 
welcome. However, in practice any immigration program would present 
many difficulties, above all, that non-Japanese people would not fit into 
the Japanese way of life. 
•	 The	image	of	the	Japanese	‘company	man’	is	fading	as	the	job	for	life	
model disappears. While open to the idea, young Japanese are reticent 
about working abroad as this would interrupt career continuity in Japan 
and thus adversely affect their prospects for advancement. 
•	 A	number	of	the	emerging	leaders	had	direct	or	indirect	knowledge	of	
Australia through personal and educational connections. However they 
reported that young Japanese more generally did not have any deep 
sense of Australia except as a good tourist destination.
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Chapter 6
Western Australia in the 
evolving regional order
Emerging trends in the Asian region offer great opportunities for Western 
Australia to develop and prosper. As has been examined in earlier chapters, 
Western Australia has been a lead player in the nation’s economic engagement 
with Asia’s rise. The export orientation of the State’s economy and resources 
sector has placed it in an extremely favourable situation in this regard and 
bodes well for future ventures. Nonetheless, optimal growth in economic 
prosperity is not a given and needs to be cultivated through the action 
of government and business. Western Australia’s edge in resources is an 
extraordinarily vibrant base for the development of the State. It also has 
strengths in other sectors that have enormous potential for growth, especially in 
areas relevant to the opportunities and challenges identified in the Region. This 
chapter examines ways that Western Australia can further a regional agenda for 
development and deepening engagement.
Western Australia as a Regional Economic Player
The impressive rates of growth in Western Australia’s resources sector in recent 
years often leads to the impression that the State is simply a ‘quarry’ supplying 
the Asian economic miracle. This impression may make easy headlines but 
it misses the fuller story. For instance, the mineral and energy sectors in the 
Western Australian economy are sophisticated operations with high-level 
expertise and technologies, placing them among world leaders in the field. 
This includes capacities ranging from world leaders in geoscience and resources 
software, environmental management, through to local community engagement 
and development. A fuller picture of other sectors such as agricultural and 
pastoral production in the state are also often overshadowed by the ‘quarry’ 
caricature of the state’s economy. Leading science and technology capacities 
and research capabilities cluster around these sectors in Western Australia. The 
larger point is that Western Australia is a modern economy that centres on the 
development of natural resources to meet growing world demand for minerals, 
energy and food, yet also has great potential in 21st century ‘knowledge 
economy’ competencies and skills (as well as natural environment and lifestyle 
attractions and industries). 
Given the importance of its trade and investment ties with Asian economies, 
Western Australia is susceptible to the fortunes of its regional partners. The 
recent slowdown in Chinese economic growth has implications for the Western 
Australian economy especially in regard to demand for mineral resources. This 
moderation in Chinese growth is sometimes presented as a portent of decline 
for the mining sector and the Australian economy. In fact, while demand 
growth may have moderated at current prices the industry is still healthy, even 
as expansion plans and employment have been curtailed as the industry has 
become more focused on its international competitiveness.liii
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Figure 7: Gross state (domestic) product growth
Note - Forecasts start in 2011-12 for Western Australia and Australia. 
Source: ABS 5220.0 State Accounts; ABS 5204.0 National Accounts; and WA and Australian Treasury
The slowing of expected growth in China alongside adjustments to Australia’s 
terms of trade have an impact on Western Australia’s economic growth. This 
emphasises the ongoing need to diversify the economy into areas with potential 
for international competitiveness, in order to foster longer-term growth and 
resilience. While the State is fortunate in terms of its mineral, energy and 
agricultural resources, Western Australia needs to broaden its economic base 
beyond these exports. New trade opportunities are being pursued yet more 
systematic efforts are required. An area for particular focus is the export of high 
value-added goods and services. 
Western Australia is well placed to expand service exports given its established 
trade and investment links in the Region and its strengths in areas of growing 
demand. Some of these areas involve the upside of Asia’s rise and in particular 
the market opportunities associated with the rapidly expanding middle 
classes. For example, Western Australia is a source of clean fresh food produce, 
education services, and quality tourism.liv Other areas of opportunity relate to 
some of the downsides of Asia’s rise, including the challenges associated with 
urbanisation pressures, environmental stress, food security and capacity deficits. 
Western Australia has world-class expertise and research capabilities relevant to 
address these challenges including in food production and water management 
in semi-arid regions, fisheries and marine ecology, health sciences and 
environmental management, business management, and public administration.lv
Australia’s investment abroad doubled over the last decade from $524.4 billion 
in 2002 to $1297.6 billion in 2012. Foreign investment stocks in Australia 
amounted to around $2000 billion, the majority of which comes from the 
UK, the US and Europe. Foreign investment from Asia was about 11 per cent 
of Australia’s FDI accumulated FDI stocks in 2012, and was predominantly 
from Japan and Singapore.lvi Chinese investment is growing, and is expected 
to continue to grow in the future. Within Western Australia investment from 
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the USA and the UK has been important in developing resource projects, with 
Japanese investors also playing a key role as minority investment partners in the 
iron ore sector.
Figure 8: WA’s major trading partners, 2012-2013 (WA, DSD, August 2013)
Investment flows between Western Australia and the Region are a key aspect in 
further developing regional links and mutual benefit. The appraisal processes 
of Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) are not always well 
understood and may generate a level of uncertainty. However, only one business 
investment proposal has been rejected by the Treasurer through the FIRB 
assessment process. Nonetheless, given the substantial benefits that come from 
investment flows, there is a need to raise greater awareness of the conditions 
and benefits of investment flows. This is particularly important in the promotion 
of Australian investment in the Region. One important way to do this would 
be to profile success stories that increase knowledge of the processes involved 
and the array of potential benefits. The generation and circulation of this type 
of information may help Australian investors to look to the wider range of 
opportunities on offer in the Region.
The minerals and energy resources sector will remain central to Western 
Australia’s economic growth and development into the future. The diversity 
and abundance of the Western Australian resources sector combined with its 
business expertise and its technological specialization leaves the industry in a 
strong position even given the moderation in demand and the need to maintain 
international competitiveness.lvii
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Knowledge Economy
Education services and the higher education sector in particular are major 
components in the dynamics of the knowledge economy. Traditionally these 
services have trained professional and research personnel for various sectors of 
the economy and for public services, as well as undertaken pure and applied 
research, some of which was commercialised. The sector still delivers these 
types of services. However, it has undergone substantial change induced by a 
number of factors, some financial but also some more fundamental. Above all 
else there is the direct implication of knowledge production with innovation 
and economic growth. For instance, advances in scientific and technological 
research and its translation into practical applications provide substantial and 
lucrative commercial opportunities in high value add areas. The demand for 
higher education has accelerated exponentially in the wake of this situation. 
The sector is becoming increasingly global and competitive as a tradeable 
service. In this sense, it is now more an industry than simply a domestic 
capacity builder. Research programs are becoming more collaborative and 
increasingly international, partly due to the complexity of problem sets now 
being addressed but also to pool human capacity and other resources. The 
higher education educational experience is also being construed more and 
more as an international endeavour, offering programs that emphasise skills 
and competencies that are mobile and agile in a global setting. In this regard, 
the higher education sector is now both tradeable and infrastructural with the 
potential to operate in a virtuous circle that develops broader economic and 
societal capacity as it advances as an industry in itself.
There are however shortfalls in the area of knowledge economy capacity in a 
number of the Asian economies (a gap which Australian educational services 
among others have filled to some degree).lviii This lag is indicative of the larger 
situation in which the dramatic growth in the export-manufacturing sector has 
not been matched by commensurate advances in the services sector in these 
economies. As a result, there has been a degree of relative underdevelopment 
in this sector, making it a top priority area for developing Asia. The Asian 
Development Banks reports that regional cooperation in the higher education 
sector has not mirrored the extent of economic integration in the Region, and 
thus there is great potential for greater regional collaboration with the range of 
benefits this can bring.lix
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Aside from the resources sector, Western Australia has significant prospects in 
developing its demonstrated strengths related to the knowledge economy. It 
has excellent research and technology capabilities in minerals and energy along 
with life sciences and agriculture, with research opportunities arising with the 
State’s ranking in the top 34 locations in the world for bio-diversity. Western 
Australia also has strengths in areas such as radio astronomy, physics and bio-
medical research that have great potential for investment and development. 
For example, the State has a major role in Australia’s participation in the 
international scientific infrastructure project, the Square Kilometre Array Radio 
Telescope. This introduces substantial levels of investment into radio astronomy 
research in the State with a wide range of possibilities for practical applications. 
Another example is the decision by the major energy corporation Chevron 
to establish the State as its third world wide hub for energy research. These 
initiatives demonstrate how great opportunities can be leveraged off existing 
and emerging capacities through partnerships and collaborations. 
Higher education has a central role to play in the knowledge economy and the 
State has strong credentials in this area. Universities in Western Australia offer 
quality teaching and learning programs and are ranked among the world-
class research universities in the world. For instance, the University of Western 
Australia is in the top one 100 on the Shanghai Jiao Tong rankings and Murdoch 
University is ranked 57 in the Times Higher Education top ‘100 under 50 years 
old’ universities. The Western Australian university sector has an impressive set 
of world-renowned expertise that is relevant to the range of opportunities and 
challenges that have emerged with the rise of the Asian economies. There are 
already university and research connections into the Region both in the delivery 
of degree programs onshore and offshore, and in research collaboration and 
joint projects. However, there is both untapped potential and a great deal of 
scope to extend and intensify these links to advance the State’s knowledge 
economy as a significant player in the Region. 
Indeed further development and investment is needed in Western Australia’s 
knowledge economy in order to meet demand in the Region and to make the 
most of emerging opportunities. State government authorities and agencies 
have been strong advocates for increasing science and technology capacity and 
innovation and a number of Centres of Excellence have been established. The 
Office of the Chief Scientist is particularly notable for its vigorous advocacy in 
this area, and the State Government is strongly promoting a science agenda.lx 
There has also been industry support of research and development especially in 
the areas of geoscience, energy and environmental research. Western Australia’s 
universities and other education peak bodies have been active in this space as 
well promoting the state’s higher education institutions in the Region, especially 
through groups such as Perth Education City.
Nonetheless, more needs to be done to advance the capacity of the State’s 
knowledge economy. Two dimensions can be identified that can help to achieve 
this. First, in order to flourish and develop, researchers and research effort 
require a greater critical mass than is currently the case in Western Australia. 
In the contemporary world of science and technology research break-throughs 
and innovation in the main are the outcome of research teams collaborating on 
problem sets. This type of collaboration not only produces significant outcomes 
in knowledge and its practical application, but also increases and develops 
capacity among those involved in the collaborative research teams. One way to 
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generate greater critical mass in research is through international partnerships. 
This means ramping up efforts to develop collaborative connections in research 
areas in which Western Australia has established strengths.
The second aspect concerns investment in research, especially in the area 
of translational research with its strong practical ramifications. In Australia 
generally, there is a need for greater public and private investment in research.8 
Thinking about this problem through a regional lens may be helpful. What 
is needed is the capability and attractiveness to invest in research programs 
that often require significant financial resourcing. A way to do this would 
be to leverage with major corporations in other countries in the Region to 
finance what are often expensive endeavours. Joint venturing in research and 
research funding in this manner offers the chance to be able to build the 
types of high cost research programs that can lead to scientific innovation and 
commercialisation potentials.
Western Australia’s Policy Reach: Limits and Possibilities
Public policy settings and regulatory regimes are major considerations if the 
Western Australian economy is to prosper and diversify. A key issue in this 
regard is the extent to which the State government and its agencies can make 
a difference and have impact. On the constraints side of this question there are 
formal limitations on what a state government as a subnational unit can do in 
the context of the Australian federal system. There are major policy areas that 
fall under the national jurisdiction or that have been nationally influenced, and 
in which the State government is not directly able to exercise sovereign power. 
These federal areas include fiscal and monetary policy, income tax, 
telecommunications, higher education finance and regulation, immigration, 
customs and quarantine, federal transportation regulation, foreign affairs and 
trade agreements, and the administration of foreign direct investment. While 
state governments in the Australian system have oversight responsibility in such 
areas as health, primary and secondary education, transport and housing, many 
of these are subject to fiscal arrangements with the Commonwealth government 
that can effect the degree of autonomy a state government can exercise. 
There are thus crucial policy and regulatory areas of responsibility that relate 
directly to regional economic relations that are out of the hands of the Western 
Australian government. Obviously it is able to introduce its own policy settings 
and programs in a number of these areas and to lobby and advocate for 
specific national policy settings and reform that may be seen to facilitate and 
benefit the State’s regional economic engagement. Given Western Australia’s 
positioning, there is a good argument to be made that this engagement is in 
the national interest. In terms of the State’s ability to pursue the opportunities in 
the Region identified above, there are a number of key items at stake including 
the negotiation of free trade agreements, the administration of foreign direct 
investment, people and business mobility, research and higher education 
funding, taxation settings, federal transport regulation and telecommunications. 
  8 On business expenditure in R&D, Australia is positioned below the OECD average (OECD, OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011, 2011: ch.2). In Western Australia, business expenditure on research 
and development was 1.50% of gross state product in 2011-2012, leading all the other states with New South 
Wales next at 1.40% followed by Victoria at 1.21% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Research and Experimental 
Development, Businesses, Australia 2011-2012, September 2013, cat. no. 8104.0, Canberra, ABS).
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The effectiveness of a state government to have influence on the shape of these 
items can be somewhat variable and subject to the play of politics. Nonetheless, 
and as already noted in Chapter 5, state government scrutiny, and involvement 
where possible, is critical. 
On the positive side of the ledger, Western Australian government authorities 
have shown a notable willingness to act as a subnational unit on the regional 
stage. On the diplomatic front, it has actively engaged with other subnational 
units at the city-to-city, province-to-province, and province-to-national levels. The 
value of these efforts is variable ranging from the purely ceremonial through to 
the development of substantial partnerships. Nonetheless, it does indicate the 
potential benefits that may be gained from complementing and supplementing 
the regular modes of engagement between nation-state actors. The government 
and non-government subnational facilitation of business-to-business, business-
government and institution-to-institution relations can also have positive results 
in realising regional opportunities and developing mutual understanding. All 
of these efforts indicate a growing awareness of how important the Region has 
become to the economic fortunes of Western Australia. The next step will be to 
dovetail this mindset with the need to diversify the State’s economy as the major 
Asian economies evolve and transform. 
State government authorities and agencies seem attentive to the need to 
emphasise the benefits of an export-orientated economy and the development 
of Western Australia’s knowledge economy. The public promotion of science 
and technology is reasonably non-controversial though more may be needed 
to ensure that an increasing proportion of secondary students choose to study 
mathematics and science.9 The State’s welcoming of certain types of foreign 
direct investment is not understood by some sections of the wider public and 
could benefit from better information and education to convey the mutual 
benefits that can be achieved. This is quite aside from this being a regulatory 
area of Commonwealth responsibility. Examples like these indicate the types of 
hurdles that are present, but also the possibilities that a subnational unit can 
encounter and encourage as it operates at the domestic, regional and global 
levels.
What can be done? 
Western Australia now faces the dual challenge of coming to grips with the 
transformations involved in the evolving regional economic order and how it 
can make the most of the opportunities arising out of these transformations. Its 
edge in resources is an extraordinarily vibrant base for the development of the 
State, especially with Perth as a global resources industry hub. Western Australia 
also has strengths in other sectors that have enormous potential for growth. The 
State government has a part to play in realising this, as does the private sector, 
both domestic and international. The following recommendations suggest ways 
that Western Australia is able to advance a regional engagement agenda. 
  9 This is also a pressing concern for Australia as whole with the growing importance of the knowledge economy. 
See Office of the Chief Scientist, Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics in the National Interest: A 
Strategic Approach, July 2013, Canberra, Australian Govt, 2013.
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 Recommendation 16
 There is an ongoing need to emphasise and promote the fact that Western 
Australia is already an active player in the regional economy. This should be 
integral to all policy and strategic economic thinking in government and 
business about how to make the most of existing and new opportunities. 
 Recommendation 17
 There is a need to pursue greater diversification of the Western Australian 
economy. This involves a realisation of the great opportunities on offer 
in the further development of the high value-add sectors of economic 
activity and where Western Australia can potentially be internationally 
competitive. It also entails an appreciation of the potential benefits to be 
made through joint ventures and foreign investment flows in the Region 
to develop existing and new areas of economic opportunities. A prime 
candidate here is the strength of Western Australia’s knowledge economy 
including its scientific research and technical expertise, and how this fits 
with regional demand and problems. This presses the need for far greater 
investment in research and development through partnerships and 
collaborations with other universities, research institutions and businesses 
in the Region.
 Recommendation 18
 There is great scope and mutual benefit for Western Australia to intensify 
its connections in the Region. There are many existing business links, 
government-to-government relations, university and people-to-people 
connections into the Region that can be further developed. The learning 
of Asian languages, student exchanges, and various forms of cultural 
engagement, all help to increase understanding and connectivity. 
Moreover, increasing knowledge in the wider community about the 
Region and Australia’s place therein is essential to advancing this agenda.
 Recommendation 19
 The development of the international agenda of higher education and its 
ability to increase regional connectivity is paramount. The gains are multiple 
ranging from the people-to people dimensions through to core aspects of 
knowledge economy development. This can be realised through student 
exchanges and internships, joint badging of degrees with universities in 
the Region (to produce ‘regional-global’ graduates), the mutual benefits 
of research collaborations and partnerships, and the merits of alumni and 
other network mechanisms. 
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Security Advisory Board for 2006-2008, a think tank attached to the National 
Security Council. He was a member of the Warwick Commission on global 
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Social Sciences, Monash University, Malaysia. Much of her research explores 
how the tensions between the global and the domestic are negotiated in the 
construction of regional governance arrangements, especially in the Asia-Pacific 
region. While continuing to study regional cooperation and governance through 
ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three and APEC, her research increasingly explores the 
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(Hons) from the University of Sydney, and his PhD in International Relations from 
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Boyer Prize from the Australian Institute of International Affairs in 2012. He has 
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the author of Governing Global Production: Resource Networks in the Asia-Pacific 
Steel Industry (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
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Cat Bevan-Jones is the Research Coordinator in the Vice Chancellor’s Office 
at Murdoch University. Cat is the project manager for The First Murdoch 
Commission, providing professional and research support to the Commission 
in the Secretariat. Prior to joining the Vice Chancellor’s Office, Cat worked 
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Australia in regional perspective
Australia
Gini Index
GDP 
(PPP USD billions)
Population 
(millions)
32.0
1011
22.2
1138
26.9
2012
2012
2025
2025
47.4
12471
1354.0
25501
1445.0
36.8
4793
1223.1
10721
1418.7
36.8
1223
244.5
2112
282.0
37.6
4491
127.6
5535
123.3
41.9
1536
50.0
2209
51.6
0.938 0.699 0.554 0.629 0.912 0.909
0.978 0.846 0.722 0.785 1.0 0.958
0.981 0.627 0.459 0.577 0.888 0.942
0.862 0.646 0.515 0.550 0.854 0.833
HDI
Health
Education
Income
China India Indonesia Japan Korea
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